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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
 
Since the issuance of SAS No. 59 in 1988, the auditor’s decision to issue a going-
concern report received much attention from legislators, the public, and researchers. SAS 
No. 59 increased the auditor’s responsibility for going-concern evaluation by requiring the 
auditor to evaluate on every audit whether substantial doubt exists about the client entity’s 
ability to continue as a going-concern. In particular, the auditor should evaluate conditions 
or events discovered during the audit engagement that raise questions about the 
appropriateness of the going-concern concept. When these conditions and events lead to 
substantial doubt about the continued existence of the entity as a going-concern, the 
auditor should consider management’s plans to mitigate the effects of these adverse 
conditions and events. If the auditor believes that management’s plans may overcome this 
substantial doubt, a going-concern report is not required. However, if the auditor decides 
that substantial doubt remains, the audit report should be modified by adding an 
explanatory paragraph following the opinion paragraph.   
Academic interest related to this topic has largely focused on unravelling the 
auditor’s going-concern decision-making process, while the issue of going-concern 
reporting accuracy has been the centre of debate for legislators and investors.  With 
respect to the frequency of audit reporting errors, prior research has shown that the 
proportion of bankrupt companies that received a going-concern modified audit opinion in 
the year immediately preceding bankruptcy is generally lower than 50 percent (Chen and 
Church, 1992; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002).  In 
addition, a study by Nogler (1995) following a total of 157 firms to the resolution of their 
going-concern opinion found that only 33 percent of the sample firms resolved their 
going-concern opinions by entering into bankruptcy proceedings, whereas 35 percent of 
the companies received an unqualified opinion in the subsequent period and 32 percent 
resolved their going-concern opinion through dissolution, liquidation or merger.   
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the going-concern decision-making framework. 
This framework emphasizes the importance of both financial and non-financial 
information in the auditor’s going-concern decision and situates both Type I and Type II  
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reporting errors in the going-concern decision framework.   More specifically, Type I 
reporting errors are defined as the issuance of a going-concern modified report for a client 
that subsequently remains viable, whereas Type II reporting errors are defined as the 
issuance of a clean report for a client that subsequently goes bankrupt.  
 











In this thesis, we contribute both to the going-concern literature and the reporting 
accuracy debate by investigating the impact of mitigating management initiatives on the 
auditor’s going-concern decision and assessing the impact of several auditor 
characteristics on the likelihood of type II errors. 
 
 
1.2  MAJOR RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The high frequency of audit reporting errors is indicative of the fact that the 
auditor’s going-concern decision is highly complicated and involves a high level of 
judgment.  This complexity has prompted the development of numerous models to predict 
the issuance of a going-concern opinion on the basis of financial predictor variables (see, 
for example; Levitan and Knoblett 1985; Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1987; Menon 
and Schwartz 1987; Bell and Tabor 1991). Although there have been studies focusing on 
the value of non-financial information in going-concern decision-making (Mutchler, 1984; 
Mutchler, Hopwood and McKeown, 1997; Behn, Kaplan and Krumwiede, 2001; Geiger 
and Rama, 2003), research on the role of mitigating management initiatives remains scant.  
In this dissertation, we add to the going-concern prediction literature by testing the 
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association between the auditor’s going-concern judgment and a comprehensive set of 
management turnaround actions. To this end, we use a unique and manually collected 
dataset containing detailed information on turnaround initiatives implemented by US 
listed companies. In addition, we investigate experimentally how the auditor’s knowledge 
of management turnaround initiatives impacts the processing of subsequent financial 
going-concern evidence. As such, we gain not only an insight into the range and type of 
mitigating management initiatives considered by auditors, but also obtain an 
understanding of the role of these initiatives in the decision-making process. 
 
Furthermore, we investigate which auditor traits are beneficial to auditor reporting 
accuracy.  Prior research that attempted to explain the causes of audit reporting errors 
mainly focused on factors such as auditor size, auditor tenure, the probability of 
bankruptcy, payment and covenant defaults, bankruptcy lag, industry sector etc. (see, for 
example, McKeown, Mutchler and Hopwood, 1991; Mutchler et al., 1997; Lennox, 1999a 
and 1999b). This dissertation contributes to this line of research by assessing the effect of 
enhanced industry knowledge or an increased focus on business risk on audit reporting 
accuracy. In particular, we investigate whether industry expertise or the adoption of the 
business risk methodology decreases the likelihood of Type II reporting errors.  As such, 
we move beyond the Big N/non-Big N dichotomy as an indication of audit quality and 
investigate which auditor traits contribute to audit reporting accuracy.  
 
 
1.3  THESIS STRUCTURE  
 
The remainder of this dissertation consists of three different chapters. They are 
written so that they can be read independently of each other. In this section, we give a 
brief overview of the chapters and highlight the connections between them. 
 
In the second chapter of this dissertation we examine the association between 
various types of management turnaround initiatives and the likelihood that a distressed 
company receives a going-concern audit opinion. In particular, we consider a broad 
variety of strategic and operating management initiatives to improve financial 
performance which have not been tested in previous studies. In order to predict the impact  
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of these management initiatives on going-concern judgment, we rely on the strategic 
management literature which offers an extensive body of research focusing on how firms 
successfully reverse severe company performance declines.  
 
In the third chapter, we back up the results of the previous chapter by providing 
experimental evidence of the relation between strategic management plans and the going-
concern decision. In addition to assessing whether the auditor considers this type of 
information, the experimental methodology allows us to investigate how management 
initiatives affect the going-concern decision-making process. We propose that, in addition 
to directly affecting going-concern judgment, strategic information also affects the going-
concern decision indirectly through its effect on memory for financial going-concern 
evidence. In addition, we investigate the differential impact of strategic information on 
experienced and novice auditors’ going-concern decision. Figure 1.2 situates chapter 2 and 
3 in the going-concern decision-making framework. 
 













In the fourth chapter, we focus on the relationship between industry specialisation, 
the business risk methodology and going-concern reporting accuracy. In addition, we 
investigate the comparative advantage of auditors possessing specialist knowledge or 
adopting a business risk focus in evaluating client turnaround initiatives. More 
specifically, we assess whether the likelihood of audit reporting errors decreases when a 
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specialist or an auditor adopting the business risk methodology. The position of chapter 4 
in the going-concern decision framework is depicted in figure 1.3. 
 












Finally, chapter 5 concludes this dissertation by providing an overview of the main 
findings and discussing limitations and avenues for future research. In addition, this 
chapter outlines the policy implications of the conducted research for audit clients, 

















Industry specialisation business risk methodology
Non-financial information
Bankrupt                        Type II error
No going-concern opinion issued
Non-bankrupt
Financially stressed company 
Bankrupt 
going-concern opinion issued
Non-bankrupt  Type I error
































CHAPTER 2   
 





In this chapter we examine the association between various types of strategic 
management actions implemented by distressed companies and the likelihood that they 
receive a going-concern audit opinion
1. Prior going-concern studies that focus on the 
impact of non-financial information investigate particular operating turnaround initiatives, 
such as cost reduction strategies (see, Behn, Kaplan and Krumwiede, 2001; and Geiger 
and Rama, 2003). We contribute to this literature by studying the impact of a broader set 
of operating turnaround initiatives (i.e. cost reduction, asset disposal, increased marketing 
and product upgrading), as well as a set of strategic growth initiatives (i.e. product 
innovation, expansion and cooperative strategies).  As the assessment of an auditee’s 
likelihood of survival within the next twelve months is critical in the going-concern 
decision-making context, we further distinguish between strategic growth initiatives that 
are likely to generate positive cash flows in the short run (i.e. cooperative agreements) 
versus long run (i.e. innovation and expansion strategies).  
Based on manually collected data on a sample of 112 distressed manufacturing US 
firms, we find that operating turnaround initiatives, as well as strategic initiatives that are 
likely to generate positive cash flows in the long run are positively associated with the 
likelihood that a going-concern opinion is received. This evidence suggests that these two 
categories of management initiatives are perceived as going-concern risk factors by 
auditors. On the contrary, strategic turnaround initiatives that are likely to generate 
positive cash flows in the short run are negatively associated with the likelihood that a 
going-concern opinion is received, which is supportive of this category of initiatives being 







                                                 
1 The ideas presented in this chapter are further developed in a working paper by L. Bruynseels and                       
M. Willekens (2006), entitled: “Strategic Actions and Going-Concern Audit Opinions”.  
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2.1    INTRODUCTION 
 
In this study we investigate whether strategic actions taken by management of 
financially distressed firms affect the auditor’s going-concern opinion decision. At least 
two features motivate why a relationship between client strategic actions and going-
concern audit decisions is likely to exist. First, SAS No. 59 explicitly prescribes the 
consideration of contrary non-financial (internal and external) matters and mitigating 
management plans in making going-concern decisions. Therefore a broad set of events, 
actions and management plans – including strategic – are potential determinants of going-
concern opinion decisions. Second, changes in auditing methodology and technology 
towards business risk auditing approaches in the second half of the nineties (such as 
Strategic-Systems Auditing as introduced in Bell, Marrs, Solomon and Thomas, 1997, and 
further developed in Bell, Peecher and Solomon, 2005) motivate the likelihood that 
strategic management actions are an integrated part of audit evidence collection. Note that 
client strategic analysis
2 is one of the most innovative aspects of business risk auditing 
methodologies. As the evidence collected from strategic analyses is likely to have a 
substantial impact on subsequently planned and executed audit procedures as well as the 
assessment of a client’s future financial viability, it is also very likely to affect the 
auditor’s going-concern opinion decision.  
It is well documented in the literature that auditors make going-concern decisions 
based on reported financial results and compliance with financial obligations (see, for 
example, Mutchler, 1985; Levitan and Knoblett, 1985; Menon and Schwartz, 1987; 
Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich, 1987; Bell and Tabor, 1991; Chen and Church, 1992; 
Gaeremynck and Willekens, 2003). The importance of information other than that 
contained in the financial statements is also emphasized in SAS No. 59. Besides the 
presence of negative financial trends and other indications of possible financial difficulties 
– like for example default on loan agreements, SAS No. 59 defines certain (non-financial) 
internal and external matters as conditions and events that may indicate that there could be 
substantial doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going-concern. Subsequently, 
SAS No. 59 also requires auditors to consider management plans to mitigate the effects of 
these adverse conditions or events when assessing their client’s ability to continue as a 
                                                 
2 or stated alternatively, acquiring evidence of and from the entity business states (EBS) as advocated in Bell 
et al. (2005).  
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going-concern. The impact on the audit opinion of contrary and mitigating factors in 
publicly available disclosures such as the financial press, 10-K’s or management 
discussions and analyses has also been documented in the going-concern literature (see 
Mutchler, Hopwood and McKeown, 1997). Although the importance of strategic 
management plans is recognized in today’s auditing practice, research on the impact of 
forward-looking management plans on going-concern decisions is scant. Behn, Kaplan 
and Krumwiede (2001) recognized this caveat and provide evidence of the relationship 
between the likelihood of going-concern opinions and a company’s ability to obtain new 
financing and to reduce costs. After controlling for financial condition, size, default status, 
and the propensity to voluntarily disclose information, their results indicate that going-
concern opinion decisions are strongly linked to publicly available mitigating information 
regarding certain management plans. In particular, plans to issue equity and to borrow 
additional funds exert the strongest association with the issuance of an unqualified 
opinion. Recently, Geiger and Rama (2003) report that companies are more likely to 
receive a modified report if they entered into a cost reduction plan or sold off significant 
assets. However, contrary to the findings of Behn et al. (2001), plans for the issuance of 
new debt or equity are not significantly associated with the auditor’s opinion type. 
The increased relevance of strategic parameters in the audit decision-making 
context in general is attributable to changes in the scope and methodology of auditing that 
have taken place in (a number of) large accounting firms in the second half of the nineties 
(see, for example, Bell et al. 1997; Lemon, Tatum and Turley 2000; Knechel, 2001; Bell et 
al. 2005; Curtis and Turley 2005). Whereas traditional auditing approaches adopt a 
bottom-up focus thereby directing attention to the nature of account balances, classes of 
transactions, and properties of the client’s accounting system, business risk auditing 
develops a top-down holistic perspective of the client’s business and industry. This entails 
a thorough analysis of the client’s business and strategic position. Note that a general 
evolution towards business risk auditing elements is reflected in some of the new 
International Audit Risk Standards. In particular, International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 
315 requires the auditor to develop an understanding of client objectives and strategies, as 
well as the related business risks that may result in a material misstatement of the financial 
statements. These business risks are not only to be evaluated in light of their immediate 
consequences for the risk of material misstatements, but also with regard to their longer-
term consequences.   
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We contribute to the going-concern literature by testing the association between 
the likelihood of going-concern opinions and a comprehensive set of strategic actions for a 
sample of distressed US manufacturing companies. Like other going-concern studies, we 
rely on information disclosed by management in the management discussion and analysis 
(MD&A), and remainder of the 10-K (Behn et al., 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003). 
Consistent with the strategy literature
3 (see for example, Barker and Duhaime, 1997; 
Robbins and Pearce II, 1992; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan, 
2003) we distinguish between management actions and plans aimed at a short-term 
improvement in financial performance (or, operating turnaround initiatives) and strategic 
growth initiatives (or, strategic turnaround initiatives). As going-concern decision-making 
involves the assessment of the likelihood of survival of an auditee within the next twelve 
months, we further sub-divide strategic growth initiatives in those that are likely to 
generate positive cash flows in the short run (i.e. cooperative agreements) versus those 
that are likely to only generate cash inflows in the long run (i.e. innovation and expansion 
strategies).  
Consistent with prior going-concern studies focusing on short-term improvement 
(or, operating) initiatives (see, Behn et al. 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003), we find that cost 
reduction strategies are positively associated with the likelihood of receiving a going-
concern opinion. In addition, we also find that marketing strategies are positively 
associated with the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. Our test of the 
strategic growth initiatives reveals that the engagement in cooperative agreements is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion, whereas 
product expansion strategies increase the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. 
Our results are consistent with cooperative agreements providing a positive signal about 
the going-concern status of the firm and therefore could be interpreted as a mitigating 
factor, whereas the presence of cost reduction, marketing and product expansion strategies 
are perceived as going-concern risk factors that increase the likelihood to receive a going-
concern opinion.  
Finally, we also test the impact of three construct variables capturing the number 
of activities within each of the three categories of management actions tested in this 
chapter: short-term operating initiatives, strategic growth initiatives that are likely to 
                                                 
3 The strategy literature contains an extensive body of research that focuses on how firms reverse firm-
threatening performance declines. See also hypothesis development section.  
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generate a short-term cash flow impact, and strategic growth initiatives that are likely to 
only generate a long-term cash flow impact. We find that an increase in the number of 
operating turnaround initiatives taken by a distressed firm’s management is associated 
with a higher likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. A similar result is obtained 
for strategic initiatives that are only capable of generating a long-term financial impact. 
On the contrary, the presence of strategic turnaround initiatives that are likely to generate 
a financial impact in the short run is negatively associated with the likelihood that a going-
concern opinion is received. Thus, our evidence suggests that auditors perceive the 
engagement in operating initiatives and strategic growth initiatives that only yield a 
financial impact in the long term as inadequate or insufficient to resolve a company’s 
going-concern problems, whereas the engagement in strategic growth initiatives that 
generate a short-term financial impact are perceived as a mitigating factor. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we provide an 
overview of the existing going-concern literature and in section 2.3 we develop our 
hypotheses. Section 2.4 then is devoted to the development of the going-concern opinion 
model that is tested in this chapter. Next, in Section 2.5 we provide an overview of our 
sample selection procedure and data collection approach. In Section 2.6 we discuss the 
results of our analyses. We conclude in Section 2.7.  
 
 
2.2 LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
With respect to the going-concern opinion, different classes of variables have been 
proposed and tested in order to assess their importance in the decision whether a company 
is likely to stay in business the next year. Most of the studies have investigated the 
influence of the quantifiable and nonquantifiable factors identified by SAS No. 34 and 
SAS No. 59 on the issuance of a qualified opinion (e.g. Mutchler, 1985; Dopuch, 
Holthausen and Leftwich, 1987; Chen and Church, 1992; Goodman and Braunstein, 1995; 
Behn et al, 2001 and Gaeremynck and Willekens, 2003).  Consistent with SAS No. 34, the 
results of a study conducted by Mutchler (1984) indicated that auditors view financial 
ratios, cash flow projections, mitigating factors and management performance/plans as 
being the most important factors in the going-concern decision.  Mutchler (1985) 
proceeded to test these propositions by examining the relationship between the going- 
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concern opinion and publicly available information for financially distressed firms. She 
found that the model containing the prior-year opinion variable and the six highest ranked 
ratios from the previous study (Mutchler, 1984) had an overall classification accuracy of 
approximately 83 percent. Levitan and Knoblett (1985) tested categories of financial 
statement variables suggested by SAS No. 34 and other variables frequently mentioned in 
bankruptcy models. Their model reached a classification accuracy approaching 90 percent. 
Menon and Schwartz (1987) went one step further and included in their model an 
extended set of operating variables, comprising not only the ability to generate cash flow 
from operations but also several profitability measures. The results indicated that recurring 
operating losses were closely associated with the auditor’s decision to qualify his opinion.  
Whereas the previous studies (except for Levitan and Knoblett, 1985) examined 
the going-concern decision for financially distressed companies, Dopuch et al. (1978) 
tested their model on a sample consisting of healthy and distressed companies.  Being the 
first to use market variables in their model, they found that there is information in market 
prices that is significantly correlated with the auditor’s decision.  Bell and Tabor (1991) 
extended this research by including not only change, but also industry-standardized 
measures of previously tested variables. Their results indicated that both rate of change 
and industry-standardized financial ratio measures provide incremental explanatory power 
in the models. Inspired by SAS No. 59, in which default on debt obligations is identified 
as a key factor in the going-concern decision, Chen and Church (1992) subsequently tested 
the impact of default status on continuity judgment. Using a sample of industrial firms, 
they found that default status adds significant explicative power to the model, even 
rendering some of the financial variables insignificant.  
More recent research considered the impact of contrary and mitigating factors in 
publicly available disclosures such as the financial press, 10-K or management discussion 
and analysis. Mutchler et al. (1997) included contrary information and mitigating factors 
taken from the financial press, instead of the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(Mutchler 1984). Not surprisingly, they found that negative events occurring before the 
issuance of the audit report have a significant impact on the going-concern decision. 
Moreover, tests even indicated that debt default events reported in the Wall Street Journal 
have a bigger impact than the mere occurrence of the event.  As mentioned earlier, Behn et 
al. (2001) added to this research by examining whether auditors’ going-concern reports are 
associated with management plans, as directed in SAS No. 59. After controlling for  
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financial condition, size, default status, and the propensity to voluntarily disclose 
information, the results indicated that going-concern reporting decisions are strongly 
linked to publicly available mitigating information relating to plans to issue equity and to 
borrow additional funds.  In addition, a study by Geiger and Rama (2003) regarding the 
association between audit fees, nonaudit fees and audit report modification decisions 
indicated that distressed companies are more likely to receive a modified report if they 
entered into cost reduction plans or entered into the sale of significant assets. 
More recently, Gaeremynck and Willekens (2003) provided evidence on the 
endogenous relationship between audit-report type and business termination for firms in a 
non-litigious environment. Using a sample of Belgian private firms, their results indicated 
that even without a litigation deterrent, a non-clean opinion is issued when firms face 
financial difficulties. Moreover, controlling for the endogenous relation between audit-
report type and business termination, their findings provide support for the self-fulfilling 
prophecy stating that financial difficulties become even more severe after receiving a non-
clean audit opinion.  In addition, they also find evidence of significant reporting 
differences between Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors in the Belgian audit market.  
 
 
2.3 HYPOTHESES  DEVELOPMENT 
 
SAS No. 59 clearly states that besides financial indicators of possible financial 
difficulties– such as negative (financial) trends – non-financial internal and external 
matters are also potentially relevant information to assess the going-concern status of a 
client firm. Examples of internal matters that are included in SAS No. 59 are work 
stoppages or substantial dependence on the success of a particular project. External 
matters listed in SAS No. 59 include, for example, legal proceedings or the loss of a key 
franchise, license or patent. Furthermore, when the identified conditions and events in the 
aggregate lead to substantial doubt about the continued existence of the entity as a going-
concern, the auditor should identify and evaluate management’s plans to mitigate the 
effects of these adverse conditions or events. If the auditor believes that there exist 
management plans that overcome this substantial doubt, a going-concern audit report is 
not required. Examples of such potentially mitigating management plans are included in  
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SAS No. 59, and relate to the sale of assets, the borrowing or restructuring of debt, the 
reduction of expenditures and the increase of ownership equity.  
A few prior studies provide evidence that auditors are indeed committed to 
reviewing management plans that are dealing with adverse conditions or events when 
assessing a client’s ability to continue as a going-concern (Behn et al., 2001; Geiger and 
Rama, 2003). However, these studies are confined to assessing the impact of examples of 
management plans and actions that are explicitly mentioned in SAS No. 59. In this 
chapter, we elaborate on this theme and investigate the impact of a broader set of 
potentially contrary or mitigating actions and strategies on the auditor’s going-concern 
decision. We motivate this broader strategic focus by the emergence of business risk 
auditing in the 1990s. With the emergence of this audit approach, traditional auditing 
methodologies have been complemented with new audit processes based on a top-down, 
holistic perspective of the client’s business and industry (see, for example, Bell et al., 
1997; Lemon, Tatum and Turley, 2000; Knechel, 2001). The most innovative aspect of 
business risk auditing is the assessment of client strategic viability, which can have a 
substantial impact on the subsequent audit procedures and the assessment of future 
financial viability.  
To predict the impact of a comprehensive set of strategic actions on the going-
concern opinion, we categorize management actions into strategic  and  operating 
turnaround approaches. This is a widely used framework introduced by Hofer (1980). 
Note that an operating approach focuses on internal, operating problems of firms through 
– for example – decreasing costs, increasing efficiency, disposing assets, or improving 
sales (Hofer, 1980). A strategic turnaround approach is aimed at long-term profitability by 
solving  external, strategic problems through for example a change in the strategic 
direction of the firm, its positioning, alliances and product lines (Bruton et al., 2003). 
Strategic repositioning may be done through business divestments, acquisitions, alliances, 
new product development, new markets, and increased market penetration. Firms 
experiencing financial distress may adopt a variety of strategies to return to financial 
health. The strategy literature offers an extensive body of research that focuses on how 
firms reverse firm-threatening performance declines to induce successful company  
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turnaround
4 (see for example, Robbins and Pearce II, 1992; Barker and Duhaime, 1997; 
Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001; Bruton et al., 2003).  
 
2.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Operating turnaround initiatives and going-concern 
opinions 
 
An operating approach to company turnaround typically consists of actions related 
to cost reduction, revenue generation and operating-asset reduction. The focus is on 
achieving short-term financial relief, without considering long-term changes in the 
organization’s strategy. In order to achieve short-term profitability improvement, 
companies have the opportunity to engage in classic retrenchment activities such as: 
divestment, product elimination, cost rationalization and employee layoffs. In addition to 
these retrenchment initiatives, revenue generating strategies may be pursued focusing on 
existing lines of products, price-cutting, increased marketing expenditures or increased 
direct sales efforts (Hofer, 1980).  
Prior studies that examine the association between the implementation of operating 
approaches and successful company turnaround have focused on retrenchment activities 
and provide mixed results. Several studies report that classic retrenchment strategies are 
significantly associated with turnaround success (see, for example, Robbins and Pearce II, 
1992), whereas other studies cast doubt on the value of operating approaches as part of a 
company’s turnaround approach (Barker III and Mone, 1994; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001).  
The mixed evidence from the strategy literature indicates that operating turnaround 
strategies per se may not be capable of curing deficiencies in a declining firm’s strategic 
orientation. In other words, if a declining firm’s problems relate to its strategic 
positioning, these short-term cures could be inadequate, given that changing a firm’s 
strategic orientation is a prerequisite to recovery (see also Schendel, Patton and Riggs, 
1976; Hofer, 1980; Barker and Duhaime, 1997). As we investigate the auditor’s 
perception of the effectiveness of operating turnaround approaches
5 for distressed firms, a 
relevant question is which signal such approaches by themselves send to the auditor 
regarding the going-concern status of the company. Given the evidence reported above, it 
                                                 
4 Successful turnaround is defined as the reversal of a firm’s pattern of performance decline (Schendel, 
Patton and Riggs, 1976).  
5 These include cost-cutting activities, disposal of assets, increasing marketing efforts and improving 
existing products and operating processes – see also Section Model Specification.  
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is likely that auditors perceive operating turnaround strategies as insufficient to induce 
recovery for distressed companies and potentially as evidence that confirms the going-
concerns problems a distressed company may have.  
 This is indeed consistent with the finding reported by Geiger and Rama (2003), 
i.e. that cost-cutting or asset disposal activities are associated with a higher likelihood of 
receiving a going-concern audit report. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
  
HYPOTHESIS 1: For financially distressed companies, the implementation of (short-term) 
operating turnaround initiatives is likely to increase (ceteris paribus) the likelihood that a 
going-concern opinion is received. 
 
2.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Strategic turnaround initiatives and going-concern 
opinions 
 
Overall, the evidence from the strategy literature suggests that (long-term) strategic 
turnaround approaches are successful turnaround vehicles. Barker III and Duhaime (1997) 
find that when a company’s decline is firm-based and not caused by industry contraction, 
recovering firms implement more extensive strategic changes (which are consistent with 
reorientation). Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) provide evidence that firms recovering from 
financial distress typically adopt more forward-looking, expansionary and external market 
focused strategies, whereas non-recovery firms continue to engage in operating 
restructuring strategies. Given the evidence from the strategy literature about the 
effectiveness of strategic approaches for company turnaround and recovery, it is 
reasonable to expect that such strategies may also have a mitigating impact on the 
auditor’s going-concern opinion. However, as the auditor’s going-concern opinion is an 
assessment of the client’s ability to survive during the next 12 months, only those (long-
term) strategic approaches that are expected to have a positive impact on the company’s 
liquidity status within the next 12 months will be perceived as mitigating factors. It is 
therefore necessary to further examine the short-term impact of the different types of long-
term strategic approaches, i.e. cooperative agreements, product innovation and acquisition 
strategies. 
Barker III and Duhaime (1997) emphasize that cooperative agreements with other 
firms are an essential element of a turnaround approach based on strategic change.  
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Examples of cooperative strategies include long-term contractual agreements with 
suppliers or buyers, alliances or joint ventures, subcontracting and technology licensing 
agreements
6. Prior research about the consequences of the implementation of a 
cooperative strategy has shown that strategic networks such as strategic alliances, joint-
ventures and long-term buyer-supplier relationships often have positive effects on 
different measures of corporate performance. For example, Mitchell and Singh (1996) 
reported evidence of alliances raising organisational survival rates. Powell, Koput and 
Smith-Doerr (1996) found that companies which had formed many alliances experienced 
accelerated growth rates. Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer (2000) highlight the idea that one of 
the most important benefits of strategic networks is the increased access to information, 
resources, markets and technologies. Moreover, alliances may be a preferred growth 
alternative to acquisitions if a high level of uncertainty exists because of their greater 
strategic flexibility and potentially lower levels of risk (Kogut, 1991; Hitt, Keats and 
DeMarie, 1998; Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson and Ireland, 2001; Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath, 
2002). The reasoning behind this is that alliances provide access to complementary assets 
and competences, while sharing the risks and costs with a partner. In addition to access to 
resources, Stuart (2000) found that strategic alliances also affect firm subsequent-period 
performance through their influence on an organization’s reputation, particularly if the 
firm is of ambiguous quality.  
This evidence from the strategic literature suggests that interfirm cooperations are 
strategic initiatives that are likely to have a positive impact on firm performance in the 
short run. Given that the auditor’s going-concern decision is an assessment of the client’s 
ability to survive during the next 12 months, we expect such strategies to send a positive 
signal to the auditor. Hence, we state the following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2A: For financially distressed companies the implementation of strategic 
turnaround initiatives that are likely to generate short-term positive cash flows, is likely to 
reduce (ceteris paribus) the likelihood that a going-concern audit opinion is received. 
                                                 
6 Note that strategic alliances are a popular financing vehicle for companies in financial distress, as 
partnering up with a successful healthy company can provide distressed companies with additional funding 
to develop or market products, or with other benefits such as a more extensive customer base (see, for 
example, Bruton et al. 2003). Another vehicle to improve financial position is engaging in a licensing 
strategy with regard to unused or high-risk technology. Licensing out proprietary technology can 
substantially improve a company’s financial position as it periodically receives royalties and/or milestone 
payments (see, for example, Sudarsanam and Lai 2003). A company can also safeguard future sales by 
engaging into long-term contracting with buyers or distributors (Miller, 1992).  
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Capon, Farley, Lehman and Hulbert (1992) report that new product development 
and strategic acquisitions are important to a firm’s long-term financial performance, and 
report evidence that suggests that both strategies act as substitutes in terms of 
effectiveness vis-à-vis company turnaround (i.e. non-innovative firms that involve in 
acquisitions perform nearly as well as those that engage in product innovations). However, 
the short-term performance impact of both types of strategic actions is not always 
favorable. In a recent meta-analytic review of merger and acquisition performance, King, 
Dalton, Daily and Covin (2004) report that acquisitions are not improving the short-term 
financial performance of acquiring firms, on average. Instead, this study indicates that the 
(short-term) returns for acquiring firms are insignificant or negative beyond the day a 
merger or acquisition is announced. This result holds for separate meta-analyses of both 
market returns (abnormal returns) and accounting returns (ROA, ROE and ROS). 
Additionally, Hitt and al. (1998) find the existence of a significant amount of financial 
slack to be an important attribute of successful acquisitions, whereas large or 
extraordinary debt characterizes unsuccessful acquisitions. This suggests that corporate 
acquisitions may not be adequate turnaround vehicles for severely distressed companies.  
Similarly, prior research with respect to product development (e.g., Leonard-
Barton, 1995; Winter and Szulanski, 2002; Mishina, Pollock and Porac, 2004) emphasizes 
that product expansion involves great levels of unpredictability as it requires the 
development of new routines or the recombination of old routines. This is corroborated by 
Calantone, Vickery and Dröge (1995), who describe new product development as a risky 
undertaking.  With respect to its short-term impact on profitability, Mishina et al. (2004) 
even report a negative association of new product development with the rate of short-term 
sales growth.  
In sum, these studies suggest that the introduction of new products and corporate 
acquisitions are highly unpredictable activities that are not likely to have a positive effect 
on financial performance within the next 12 months. Therefore, we expect that the auditor 
will not perceive these strategies as mitigating factors in the going-concern decision, but 
rather as going-concern risk factors. Hence, we state the following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2B: For financially distressed companies the implementation of strategic 
turnaround initiatives that are unlikely to generate short-term positive cash flows, is likely 
to increase (ceteris paribus) the likelihood that a going-concern audit opinion is received.  
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2.4  MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
 
We use the following logistic model to test our two hypotheses: 
REPORT = f (operating turnaround variables, strategic turnaround variables, control 
variables)  
 
REPORT is an indicator variable that equals one if the auditor issues a going-
concern report, and zero otherwise. The turnaround approach variables contain 
information regarding turnaround strategies that have been implemented by the company 
during the year under audit to overcome adverse conditions affecting corporate 
performance. This information is manually collected from corporate disclosures in the 
annual report and 10-K. We investigate the impact of two categories of turnaround 
strategies that can potentially mitigate the adverse conditions affecting company 
performance. In the category of operating turnaround strategies, we consider the impact of 
cost-cutting and asset disposal activities, product and operating process improvements and 
increasing marketing efforts. As strategic turnaround approaches, we consider cooperative 
agreements with other firms, the introduction of new products, mergers, and acquisitions. 
Finally, the control variables in our model encompass factors that have been found to be 
associated with the going-concern opinion in prior research.  
 
2.4.1 Operating  turnaround  variables 
 
Our classification of operating turnaround variables is based on Hofer (1980) who 
distinguishes between four different types of operating turnaround approaches: a) cost-
cutting strategies, b) asset reduction strategies, c) revenue increasing strategies and d) 
combination strategies. Accordingly, we include and test variables reflecting a cost 
reduction strategy (O-COSTRED), an asset disposal strategy (O-DISPOSE), a commercial 
strategy (O-COMMERCIAL), and a strategy aimed at the improvement of existing 
products and processes (O-UPGRAD).  
We define O-COSTRED as an operating turnaround variable that captures 
significant cost reduction efforts. In particular, this variable relates to both employee 
layoffs and other cost reduction efforts during the year under audit. O-COSTRED is set 
equal to one if the company reports cost reduction strategies for the year under audit, and  
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is set equal to zero otherwise. O-DISPOSE is defined as an operating turnaround variable 
that indicates whether a company engages in the sale of significant assets. O-DISPOSE is 
set equal to one if the company reports the sale of assets for the year under audit, and is set 
equal to zero otherwise. As opposed to operating actions aimed at reducing expenditures, 
short-term operating strategies also include a number of revenue generating activities 
(Hofer, 1980). Subsequently, we define O-COMMERCIAL as an operating turnaround 
variable that indicates whether a company increases its marketing efforts, and O-
UPGRAD as a variable that relates to the realisation of improvements in existing products 
and production processes. O-COMMERCIAL is set equal to one if the company reports 
increased marketing efforts for the year under audit, and is set equal to zero otherwise. O-
UPGRAD is set equal to one if the company reports product and/or process improvements 
for the year under audit, and is set equal to zero otherwise.  
In order to extend and refine our analyses, we also define a number of strategic 
construct variables. This will enable us to test the aggregate impact of strategic turnaround 
variables that have similar characteristics on theoretical grounds. OPERATING is defined 
as the sum of O-COSTRED, O-DISPOSE, O-COMMERCIAL and O-UPGRAD, scaled 
by its maximum value in the sample. Note that a further refinement in short-term versus 
long-term impact variables would be tautological in the context of operating initiatives, as 
they are all expected to have a short-term impact on financial performance.  
  
2.4.2  Strategic turnaround variables 
 
Long-term strategic turnaround approaches typically relate to reconfiguration of 
the assets and/or the corporate portfolio, and product and/or market refocusing. S-
EXPANSION is a strategic turnaround variable capturing whether a company engages in 
acquisitions of other companies to accelerate growth. S-EXPANSION is set equal to one 
if the company reports acquisitions for the year under audit, and is set equal to zero if such 
is not the case. We also include S-COOP, a variable that indicates whether a company 
enters into strategic alliances, joint-ventures, licensing agreements and other cooperative 
arrangements. S-COOP is set equal to one if a company entered in cooperative 
arrangements during the year under audit, and is set equal to zero if such is not the case. 
Further, we define S-PRODUCT as a strategic turnaround variable that assesses whether a 
company has recently introduced new products. S-PRODUCT is set equal to one if the  
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company reports the introduction of new products during the year under audit, and is set 
equal to zero if such is not the case.  
Finally, we also introduce strategic construct variables to capture the aggregate 
impact of several strategic turnaround initiatives engaged in by the audited firm. We 
distinguish between strategic initiatives that are expected to have a positive cash flow 
impact in the short run (STRATST) or only in the long run (STRATLT). This 
categorization can be motivated by recent evidence in the strategy literature (see, King et 
al. 2004; Mishina et al. 2004) that acquisitions and product innovations are not improving 
the short-term financial performance of acquiring and innovating firms, respectively. Such 
a distinction in short-term and long-term financial impact is warranted given the going-
concern decision context that we are investigating. STRATST is an indicator variable 
which happens to coincide with S-COOP, as the presence of cooperative agreements is the 
only strategic turnaround variable defined in this chapter that is likely to generate a 
financial impact within the next twelve months. STRATLT is defined as the sum of S-
PRODUCTS and S-ACQUIS, divided by its maximum value in the sample. We also refer 
to Table 2.1, for an overview of definitions of the strategic variables. 
 
2.4.3 Control  variables 
 
The issuance of a going-concern opinion is obviously conditional upon the 
auditee’s financial condition. Therefore a first category of control variables that are 
included in our model capture the financial condition of the firm. Based on prior audit 
opinion studies (see, for example, Mutchler 1985; Chen and Church, 1992) we include 
cash flow from operations divided by total liabilities (CFOTL), the current ratio (CR), and 
long-term debt divided by total assets (LTDTA), as control variables. Following Menon 
and Schwartz (1987), we also include a change variable, namely the change in current 
ratio (CHANGECR). In line with Bell and Tabor (1991), we control for a company’s 
liquidity performance relative to the industry by including an indicator variable (INDCR), 
which equals one if the current ratio of the company exceeds the industry median current 
ratio, and zero otherwise. As in Chen and Church (1992), we also add DEFAULT, an 
indicator variable that is set equal to one if the company defaults on debt payments or is in  
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technical default of loan covenants
7, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we include the 
natural log of total assets to control for company size (Chen and Church, 1992).  
A second category of control variables constitutes mitigating factors identified in 
prior audit opinion research. Behn et al. (2001) find that plans to use existing bank lines of 
credit and other approved lines of credit are negatively associated with the likelihood of 
receiving a going-concern opinion. Consistent with Behn et al. (2001) we include 
BORROW, a variable that is set equal to one if the auditee plans to borrow funds through 
existing bank lines of credit or other approved debt instruments; and STOCK, a variable 
that is set equal to one if the auditee plans to issue equity through existing or committed 
arrangements. The definition of the test and control variables together with their 
hypothesized sign is given in table 2.1. 
   TABLE 2.1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND EXPECTED SIGNS 
Variables  Definition  Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable    
    REPORT  1 if going-concern report issued, 0 otherwise   
Independent variables    
  Operating approach    
O-COSTRED  1 if the company reports cost reducing activities for the year 
under audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
O-DISPOSE  1 if the company reports the sale of assets for the year under 
audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
O-COMMERCIAL  1 if the company reports increased marketing efforts for the 
year under audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
O-UPGRAD  1 if whether the company reports product and/or process 
improvements for the year under audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
OPERATING    A score from 0 to 4, scaled by its maximum value in the 
sample, representing the sum of all operating initiatives (O-
COSTRED, O-DISPOSE, O-COMMERCIAL,  O-UPGRAD) 
+ 
  Strategic approach    
S-EXPANSION  1 if the company reports acquisitions for the year under audit, 
0 otherwise 
+ 
S-COOP  1 if the company entered in cooperative arrangements for the 
year under audit, 0 otherwise 
- 
S-PRODUCT  1 if the company reports the introduction of new products for 
the year under audit, 0 otherwise 
+ 
STRATST  Dummy variable, coded one if the company undertakes 
strategic initiatives with a short-term impact (S-COOP)  
- 
STRATLT  A score from 0 to 2, scaled by its maximum value in the 
sample, representing the sum of all strategic initiatives with a 
long-term impact (S-EXPANSION, S-PRODUCTS)  
+ 
    
                                                 
7 A company’s default status was determined by reading the MD&A and debt footnotes in the financial 
statements.  
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   TABLE 2.1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND EXPECTED SIGNS 
Variables  Definition  Expected 
Sign 
  Control variables    
CR Current  ratio  - 
LTDTA  Long term debt divided by total assets  + 
LNTA  Natural log of total assets  - 
CFOTL  Cash flow from operations divided by total liabilities  - 
INDCR  1 if company CR exceeds industry median, 0 otherwise  - 
CHANGECR  One year change in current ratio  - 
DEFAULT  1 if in payment default or technical default of loan covenants, 
0 otherwise 
+ 
STOCK  1 if the company plans to sell a significant amount of equity, 0 
otherwise 
- 
BORROW  1 if the company plans to rely on existing loans and credit 
agreements, 0 otherwise 
- 
    
 
 
2.5  SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
  
2.5.1 Sample  selection 
 
Consistent with prior going-concern studies (see, for example, Mutchler, 1985; 
Chen and Church, 1992; and Behn et al., 2001) we selected a sample adopting a matched 
pair design. In particular, we first selected a sample of companies that received a first-time 
going-concern opinion and then selected a matched sample of distressed companies that 
did not receive a going-concern opinion. Note that a matched pair design is used most 
frequently when the research design necessitates manual data collection, as is the case in 
this study.  
 
Selection of going-concern firms 
We identified all firms from the Worldscope database that are listed on AMEX, 
NASDAQ and NYSE and received a going-concern audit opinion in the period 1998-
2001. Consistent with prior studies (Mutchler and Williams, 1990; Behn et al., 2001; Blay 
and Geiger, 2001), we restricted our sample to companies in the manufacturing industries 
(SIC 20 to 39) to eliminate confounding industry effects. This resulted in an initial sample 
of 276 manufacturing companies that received a going-concern audit opinion in fiscal 
years 1998-2001. From this initial sample, we then eliminated companies that received a  
  24
going-concern report in the previous year to control for potential confounding effects from 
prior going-concern opinions (see also, Mutchler, 1985, Blay and Geiger, 2001; Behn et 
al., 2001). In addition, we excluded firms that faced bankruptcy proceedings as the 
decision to issue a going-concern opinion is trivial for such firms, and firms for which no 
match could be identified. This resulted in 57 firms with going-concern opinions: 8 firms 
in 1998, 8 firms in 1999, 15 firms in 2000, and 26 firms in 2001.  
 
Selection of control firms 
To test our going-concern model, we matched the going-concern sample with a 
sample of distressed companies that did not receive a going-concern report. We searched 
the Worldscope database from 1998 to 2001 to identify all manufacturing companies listed 
on NASDAQ, NYSE or AMEX that received a clean audit opinion. Consistent with prior 
studies, we further restricted the control sample to firms in financial distress (see, for 
example, Mutchler, 1985; McKeown, Mutchler and Hopwood, 1991; Chen and Church, 
1992; Behn et al., 2001). Based on Chen and Church (1992) we adopt the following 
criteria to identify distressed companies:  1) negative retained earnings, 2) negative 
operating income, 3) negative net income, 4) negative working capital, 5) negative net 
worth, and 6) negative operating cash flows. Note that Chen and Church (1992) classified 
a company as stressed if it met at least one distress criteria. We use a more stringent rule 
for financial distress, by classifying a company to be stressed if it meets at least two of the 
above stress criteria. This procedure yielded 2929 “distressed” companies that received a 
clean opinion during the period 1998-2001. 
As we use a matched-pair design, we matched control-sample companies to the 
going-concern firms based on year, size (proxied by total assets) and two-digit SIC 
classifications. This procedure ensures that we include similar companies with respect to 
size and industry in both sub-samples. A matched group design has been used previously 
by Mutchler (1985), Chen and Church (1992), Behn et al. (2001) and Geiger and Rama 
(2003). A limitation of this choice-based sample selection approach is that it overstates the 
issuance of a going-concern opinion in this experimental setting. Note that we address this 
issue by our statistical approach, as we adopt logistic regression analysis (see further). 
This approach yields a total sample of 114 (2 x 57) distressed firm observations. Two 
observations were identified as outliers and were removed from the sample. Hence, our  
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final sample consists of 112 distressed firm observations.   The number of observations 
per industry is given in table 2.2. 
 
    TABLE 2.2: SAMPLE COMPANIES PER TWO DIGIT INDUSTRY GROUPING 
Two-digit 
SIC Code 
Industry name  Number of 
Companies 
20  Food and Kindred Products  6 
27  Printing and Publishing  2 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  32 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products  2 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  2 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  2 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  10 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  26 
37 Transportation  Equipment  10 
38  Instruments and Related Products  20 
  112 
 
 
2.5.2 Data  collection  and strategic scorecard 
 
As strategic company information is not publicly available, we manually collected 
this information from the relevant 10-Ks filed with the SEC, by reading these documents 
cover to cover and completing a strategic scorecard. The strategic scorecard used to test 
our hypotheses is included in Appendix 2.1. For each of the defined turnaround 
approaches we assessed whether the company has engaged in actions related to that 
specific turnaround initiative during the year under audit. Per initiative, a score equal to 
one is assigned if a firm discloses such action, and zero otherwise. 
The suitability of 10-K filings for strategic information collection is supported by 
prior studies that investigated the association between disclosures in the MD&A and 
future corporate financial performance. These studies report evidence indicating that the 
information content of narrative disclosures in the annual report is significantly associated 
with the future viability of distressed firms (see, for example, Tennyson and Ingram, 1990; 
Boo and Simnett, 2002). Boo and Simnett (2002) examine the reliability of management’s 
prospective comments for a sample of 140 Australian public companies that had 
experienced significant losses. Their results indicate that these prospective comments have 
significant information content with respect to the company’s future viability. Note also 
that SAS No. 8 requires auditors to ensure that the ‘other information’ attached to 
financial statements is not materially inconsistent with the financial statements, and does  
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not contain any material misstatement. Furthermore, the costs of potential litigation and 
loss of reputation are important factors to prevent management from disclosing misleading 
information.  
Note that the dependent variable and (most of) the control variables in the model 
are collected from the WORLDSCOPE data base. The information regarding 
management's plans to rely on existing borrowing capacity or to issue equity is also 





2.6.1 Descriptive  statistics and univariate results 
 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 contain the descriptive statistics for the test and control 
variables. The descriptive statistics in Table 2.3 relate to the full sample (of distressed 
companies), whereas the descriptive statistics in Table 2.4 are given for the going-concern 
and non-going-concern samples separately. Table 2.4 also reports the results of a t-test of 
differences between the going-concern and non-going-concern samples.  Inspection of 
Table 2.3 reveals that the most common turnaround approaches in our (full) sample of 
distressed firms are the cost reduction strategy (O-COSTRED,  appearing in 60% of the 
sample firms) and the cooperative strategy (S-COOP, appearing in 60% of the sample 
firms). All other approaches only occur in between 15 and 35 percent of the sample firms.  
TABLE 2.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
   Operating approach       
O-COSTRED  0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
O-DISPOSE  0.31 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
O-COMMERCIAL  0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
O-UPGRAD  0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
OPERATING  0.35 0.25 0.23 0.00 1.00 
          
   Strategic Approach            
S-EXPANSION  0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
S-COOP  0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
S-PRODUCT  0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
STRATST  0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
STRATLT  0.24 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
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TABLE 2.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
 
Control  variables       
CR  3.27 1.75 5.46 0.21 45.45 
LTDTA  0.13 0.02 0.28 0.00 1.97 
LNTA  10.34 9.83  1.55  7.06 14.56 
CFOTL  -1.55 -0.32  3.27 -25.82 1.28 
INDCR  0.31 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
CHANGECR  -0.65 -0.49  4.66 -14.48  31.83 
DEFAULT  0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
STOCK  0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 
BORROW  0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
 
 
The results in Table 2.4 indicate that the companies that received a going-concern 
audit report have a significantly lower current ratio (CR, t-statistic = 2.91), are more likely 
to have a lower current ratio than the industry average value (INDCR, t-statistic = 5.18), 
are less likely to be in default (DEFAULT, t-statistic = 3.73) and engage less frequently in 
additional borrowings (BORROWING, t-statistic = 5.42). These results are consistent with 
going-concern opinions being issued for distressed companies that face short-term 
liquidity problems. Note that the non-significant differences between the two samples with 
respect to the other financial distress variables (other than liquidity measures) and total 
assets are supporting the efficacy of our matching procedures. Only a few turnaround 
activities appear to be significantly different for going-concern and non-going-concern 
companies. The strongest result is found for cost-cutting activities which are significantly 
more common in the sample of going-concern firms (O-COSTRED, t-statistic = 2.14). 
The aggregate OPERATING variable is also (weakly) significantly higher for the going-
concern sample (OPERATING, t-statistic = 1.99). The occurrence of strategic turnaround 
activities is generally not significantly different between going-concern and non-going-









TABLE 2.4: UNIVARIATE TESTS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GOING-CONCERN FIRMS AND NON-GOING-
CONCERN FIRMS  
  Non-Going-Concern sample  Going-concern sample  Test of difference 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean   Std. Dev.  (t-statistic) 
Operating approach        
O-COSTRED  0.50 0.50 0.70 0.46  2.14** 
O-DISPOSE  0.27 0.45 0.36 0.48  1.01 
O-COMMERCIAL 0.25  0.44 0.29 0.46  0.42 
O-UPGRAD  0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41  0.23 
OPERATING  0.30 0.23 0.39 0.22  1.99** 
Strategic  Approach        
S-EXPANSION  0.11 0.31 0.20 0.40  1.32 
S-COOP  0.66 0.48 0.54 0.50  1.35 
S-PRODUCT  0.29 0.46 0.38 0.49  1.00 
STRATST  0.66 0.48 0.54 0.50  1.35 
STRATLT  0.20 0.28 0.29 0.30  1.63 
 Control Variables        
CR  4.72 6.98 1.81 2.67 2.91*** 
LTDTA  0.10 0.16 0.15 0.36  1.02 
LNTA  10.35 1.52 10.33 1.59  0.05 
CFOTL  -1.58 3.84 -1.52 2.61  0.10 
INDCR  0.52 0.50 0.11 0.31 5.18*** 
CHANGECR  0.12 5.74 -1.42 3.12  1.76* 
DEFAULT  0.20 0.40 0.52 0.50 3.73*** 
STOCK  0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33  0.00 
BORROW  0.48 0.50 0.07 0.26 5.42*** 
*      indicates significance at the .10 level (two-tailed) 
**    indicates significance at the .05 level (two-tailed) 
***  indicates significance at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
 
  
2.6.2 Multivariate  logistic  analysis 
 
To test our hypotheses and assess which strategic and operating variables are 
significantly different between going-concern and other firms we estimate three logistic 
regression models.  Logistic regression analysis (instead of probit analysis) is highly 
appropriate as we adopt a matched sampling approach. The use of logistic regression 
analysis neutralizes potential problems resulting from oversampling going-concern 
companies relative to the population proportion. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
coefficients of the independent variables are not affected by disproportionate sampling, 
only the intercept term is biased. However, since we are not estimating parameters for the 
purpose of developing a predictive model, the bias in the intercept term has no effect on 
our analysis and conclusions (Maddala, 1991). We also tested whether there are 
multicollinearity problems between the independent variables that may affect our results. 
Inspection of the correlation matrix (see Appendix 2.2) indicates that most correlations  
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between the independent variables are below 30 percent. As there are some larger 
correlations, we also calculated VIF factors, but all VIF scores are below 4.55.  
  We report the results from our multivariate logistic analyses in Table 2.5. We 
estimate three models. Model 1 is estimated to establish a base model for going-concern 
opinions based on prior audit opinion studies, and thus mainly includes financial health 
variables and variables that capture the ability to engage in additional borrowings and 
stock issues. Models 2 and 3 are estimated to test our hypotheses and assess which   
strategic and operating variables have incremental explanatory power beyond the control 
variables.  
 
Model 1 has good explanatory power with a chi-square statistic equal to 79.28, a 
pseudo R
2 equal to 0.61 and a McFadden R² equal to 0.51. The current ratio (CR, p = 
0.0056), firm size (LNTA, p = 0.0905), operating cash flow over total liabilities (CFOTL, 
p = 0.0001), the company’s current ratio relative to the industry (INDCR, p = 0.0086), 
default on debt obligations (DEFAULT, p = 0.0029) and capacity to borrow (BORROW, 
p = 0.0036) are significant in a multivariate setting. These results indicate that in a 
distressed firms’ context, poor liquidity is positively associated with the likelihood of 
receiving a going-concern opinion, whereas the ability of a firm to rely on existing 
borrowing capacity is a mitigating factor. Note again that lack of significance of the other 
financial variables illustrates the efficacy of our matching procedures. 
 
We estimate Model 2 in order to investigate the incremental explanatory power of 
all defined operating and strategic initiatives (see Table 2.1 for their definitions). Including 
the individual strategic and operating variables in the going-concern model improves the 
model’s explanatory power, with a model chi-square equal to 103.84 (instead of 79.28 for 
Model 1), a pseudo R² equal to 0.67 (instead of 0.61 for Model 1) and a McFadden R² 
equal to 0.67 (instead of 0.51 for Model 1). Of the four turnaround variables that capture 
operating initiatives, the cost-cutting variable (O-COSTRED, p = 0.0070) is positively and 
significantly associated with the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. This 
result is consistent with the evidence in Geiger and Rama (2003). The analysis further 
indicates that increased marketing efforts (O-COMMERCIAL, p = 0.0051) yield a similar 
positive result, indicating that marketing activities increase the likelihood of receiving a 
going-concern opinion. These findings are consistent with our first hypothesis, stating that  
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operating turnaround strategies do not function as mitigating factors in an audit opinion 
decision context, but rather reinforce the signal that the company faces going-concern 
problems. This is consistent with evidence from the strategy literature that companies that 
only implement operating turnaround actions without (subsequently) implementing 
strategic turnaround actions have a lower survival chance (Sudarsanam en Lai, 2001). 
Finally, we do not find a significant result for O-DISPOSE and O-UPGRAD. 
Of the three defined strategic turnaround variables both S-COOP (p = 0.0437) and 
S-PRODUCT (p = 0.0962) are significantly associated with the likelihood to receive a 
going-concern opinion. S-COOP is negatively associated with the likelihood of receiving 
a going-concern opinion. This result is consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 2a, 
and indicates that companies that entered into cooperative agreements with other firms 
during the year under audit are less likely to receive a going-concern audit report. This 
also implies that cooperative agreements are seen as positive turnaround signals by the 
auditor (with favourable liquidity effects already within the next 12 months) and hence 
can be considered as a mitigating factor. This result is not surprising, as prior research has 
shown that strategic networks often have positive effects on corporate performance 
through access to resources and its influence on corporate reputation (Mitchell and Singh, 
1996; Powell et al., 1996; Stuart, 2000).  
Consistent with hypothesis 2b, S-PRODUCT (p = 0.0962) or product innovation is 
positively associated with the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. As stated 
previously, this type of strategic initiative although potentially successful, is not likely to 
generate a positive cash flow effect in the next twelve months. As a consequence, the 
results of our analyses show that product innovations in a distressed firm context (and in 
their initial stage – that is the year during which the initiative has been taken) are 
perceived as a going-concern risk factor. S-EXPAND (p = 0.1287), or growth through 
mergers and acquisitions, is also a strategic initiative that is highly unlikely to generate a 
positive cash flow effect in the next twelve months. Although not significant, it has a 
positive sign. Both results can be explained by the fact that, in a distressed firm context, 
the presence of recently undertaken strategic actions with a long-term positive cash flow 
effect (such as the introduction of new products and the acquisition of another company) 
may be perceived as very risky actions of which the outcome is uncertain. As evidenced 
by prior evidence in the strategy literature (King et al. 2004) it is not very likely that an 
acquisition improves liquidity within in the next twelve months. Similarly, it is not very  
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likely that the introduction of new products leads to massive positive cash flows in the 
first year. Note that Mishina et al. (2004) even report a negative association between 
product innovation and short-term financial performance.  
 
In Model 3 we test construct variables that are based on Hofer’s (1980) 
classification of turnaround initiatives into operating (OPERATING) versus strategic 
approaches (STRATST and STRATLT). As indicated before, we make a distinction 
between strategic growth initiatives that are likely to have a short-term versus long-term 
cash flow impact (STRATST vs. STRATLT). We believe that this refined categorization 
is necessary given the going-concern opinion context in which we study strategic actions, 
as well as recent findings in the strategy literature (King et al., 2004; Mishina et al. 2004) 
that indicate that some strategic actions do not have a short-term positive effect on 
financial performance. The explanatory power of Model 3 clearly outperforms Model 1, 
with a model chi-square of 95.65, a pseudo-R² of 0.66 and a McFadden R
2 equal to 0.62. 
Estimation of Model 3 yields significant and strong results for all three strategic 
constructs, i.e. OPERATING (p = 0.0067), STRATST (p = 0.0448) and STRATLT (p = 
0.0097). The results are supportive of our first hypothesis that operating initiatives do not 
have a mitigating impact on the going-concern decision. More specifically, the 
implementation of operating initiatives seems to send a negative signal to the auditor as 
they are associated with a significantly higher likelihood that a going-concern report is 
received. Consistent with Hypotheses 2a, our results further indicate that strategic 
initiatives that are likely to generate positive cash flows in the short run serve as a 
mitigating factor, as STRATST has a negative coefficient. Note that our third strategic 
construct variable, STRATLT is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood 
of receiving a going-concern opinion. This confirms hypothesis 2b, suggesting that 
strategic initiatives that are only likely to have a positive cash flow effect in the long run 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Overall, the evidence that we present suggests that the inclusion of variables that 
capture operating and strategic turnaround initiatives enhances the explanatory power of 
going-concern opinion models for distressed firms. Also, the results indicate that the 
presence of cost reduction strategies or increased marketing efforts is perceived as an 
additional going-concern risk factor as these strategies increase the likelihood of receiving 
a going-concern opinion. Product innovations, although they are quite different in nature, 
seem to be perceived equally risky. On the contrary, cooperative agreements provide 
positive signals about the going-concern status of the firm and therefore seem to function 
as a mitigating factor. Our tests of aggregated constructs of operating and strategic 
variables with similar features confirm these conclusions.  
 
2.6.3 Supplementary  analyses 
 
Because the operating and strategic turnaround variables are derived from client 
disclosures, we also re-ran the models including a set of variables that control for potential 
systematic differences amongst firms in making voluntary disclosures. By doing this, we 
aim to ensure that the operating and strategic test variables capture a firm’s strategic 
performance instead of its general propensity to disclose corporate information. Botosan 
(1997) reports that four firm characteristics are significantly positively correlated with the 
propensity to disclose, namely: exchange listing status, firm size, audit-firm size, and 
leverage. Note that firm size and leverage are already included in our model specifications 
given their previously mentioned association with going-concern audit reports (see supra). 
As far as exchange listing status is concerned, prior studies (see, for example, Branson, 
Guffey and Pagach, 1998) find that there is typically less information provided by 
NASDAQ firms as opposed to NYSE/AMEX firms. We reran our analyses including two 
additional indicator variables: (1) EXCHANGE, which equals one if the firm is traded on 
NASDAQ, and zero otherwise; and (2) AUDITOR, which is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the company is audited by a big N audit firm. The results show that including 
these two additional control variables (EXCHANGE and AUDITOR) does not add 
significant explanatory power (p < 0.9875 and p < 0.6949) and leaves the results largely 
unchanged. 
Rosman, Seol and Biggs (1999) report that an auditor’s consideration of non-
financial information in a going-concern task differs between start-up and mature  
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companies. We performed several analyses to ensure that our results are not driven by 
company age. Univariate analyses of company age (AGE) across both the experimental 
and control samples indicate that there is no difference between going-concern and non-
going-concern firms (p = 0.9726) regarding age. Including AGE in our test models does 
not add significant explanatory power nor changes the significance levels of the other 
variables. We also assessed possible interaction effects of AGE with the seven strategic 
variables defined in this study. The results of this analysis indicate that the introduction of 
new products (p = 0.0332) has a less negative impact on the going-concern decision if the 





In this study we examine the impact of a broad range of operating and strategic 
turnaround initiatives on the likelihood that an auditor issues a going-concern audit 
opinion. We analyse whether these turnaround activities are functioning as mitigating 
factors or as going-concern risk factors. Prior studies that assess the impact of 
management plans on going-concern decisions (see, for example, Behn et al., 2001; 
Geiger and Rama, 2003) look at forward-looking plans relating to retrenchment activities 
and future financing. In this study, we investigate a more comprehensive set of strategic 
and operating actions. Consistent with the strategy literature, we classify strategic actions 
into (short-term) operating versus (long-term) strategic turnaround approaches. Based on 
the mixed results in the strategy literature regarding the effectiveness of short-term 
operating turnaround initiatives and recent going-concern research by Geiger and Rama 
(2003), we hypothesize that such activities are perceived as going-concern risk factors that 
increase the likelihood of receiving a going-concern audit report (Hypothesis 1). Based on 
the findings in the strategy literature, we further hypothesize a significant relationship 
between strategic turnaround approaches and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern 
opinion. However, given the going-concern decision-making context we distinguish 
between strategies that are expected to generate a positive cash flow effect within the next 
twelve months and strategies that are only likely to have a positive impact on performance 
in the long run. More specifically, we hypothesize that strategies that are likely to have a 
positive effect on performance in the short run function as mitigating factors (Hypothesis  
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2a), whereas strategies that are not likely to generate a cash flow effect in the short run 
(and on top of that are quite risky) are expected to be perceived as going-concern risk 
factors (Hypothesis 2b).  
We find indeed that the presence of cost reduction and marketing strategies is 
perceived as a going-concern risk factor and increases the likelihood to receive a going-
concern opinion, whereas cooperative agreements provide positive signals about the 
going-concern status of the firm and therefore can be interpreted as mitigating factors. 
Moreover, our evidence suggests that product innovations – which are not likely to 
generate a positive cash flow effect within the next twelve months - are not perceived as 
mitigating factors but rather as going-concern risk factors.  
In addition to testing the impact of individual operating and strategic initiatives, we 
extended our analysis by testing aggregated constructs of operating and strategic variables 
that have similar features. We identify three different constructs: operating initiatives, 
strategic turnaround initiatives that are not likely to generate positive cash flow effects in 
the short run, and strategic turnaround initiatives that are likely to do so. The analyses 
confirm that operating turnaround initiatives taken by distressed firms are associated with 
a higher likelihood that a going-concern opinion is received. A similar result is obtained 
for strategic initiatives that are only likely to generate positive cash flow effects in the 
long run. On the contrary, the presence of strategic turnaround initiatives that are likely to 
generate positive cash flow effects in the short run is negatively associated with the 
likelihood that a going-concern opinion is received. Thus, our evidence suggests that 
auditors perceive the engagement in operating initiatives and strategic growth initiatives 
that only yield a financial impact in the long run as going-concern risk factors, but the 
engagement in strategic growth initiatives that generate a short-term financial impact as a 
mitigating factor. 
 
This study is subject to a number of limitations. The first set of limitations relates 
to the dataset. The sample size in this study is kept rather small (n=112) due to the manual 
collection of the strategic variables. In addition, only companies from manufacturing 
industries are included in the sample. Further research is needed to determine the 
generalizability of our findings across industries.       
Third, we use the disclosure of strategic plans and information in the annual report 
and 10-K as a proxy of client strategic activity. This measure does not take into account  
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strategic plans that are disclosed directly to the auditor without being mentioned in the 
company’s 10-K. However, we believe that this will not have a substantial impact on our 
results since the suitability of 10-K filings for non-financial information collection is 
supported by prior research (see, for example, Boo and Simnett, 2002) and SEC 
registrants are required to disclose trends, demands, commitments, events and 
uncertainties presently known to management and likely to have material effects on the 
registrants financial condition (Securities Act Release no. 6835).  
Furthermore, although recommended by SAS no. 59, we do not actually measure 
the adequacy or feasibility of the publicly disclosed strategic plans.  Future research might 
address this issue by linking information with respect to a distressed companies’ operating 
and strategic health to the implemented turnaround initiatives in order to assess their 





















CHAPTER 3   
 
Strategic Performance and Auditors’ Going-Concern 





This study experimentally explores the effect of operating and strategic 
management plans on going-concern judgment. Prior archival going-concern research 
(Behn, Kaplan and Krumwiede, 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003 and chapter 2 of this 
dissertation) indicates that in a distressed firm context, operating management initiatives 
such as cost-cutting have a negative impact on auditors’ going-concern judgment, whereas 
strategic initiatives with a positive short-term impact on liquidity generally have a positive 
impact on auditors’ going-concern judgment. We add to this research by investigating 
whether these initiatives directly impact going-concern decision-making or whether they 
affect going-concern judgment indirectly through memory for financial evidence. In 
addition, we propose that strategic and operating management initiatives have a more 
pervasive impact on experienced auditors’ going-concern judgment. 
    The results of an experiment indicate that (a) strategic management initiatives 
which generate short-term cash inflows have a positive direct effect on going-concern 
decision-making, and (b) operating and strategic initiatives to mitigate financial distress 
both have a negative indirect effect on experienced auditors’ going-concern judgment 















This study experimentally investigates the effect of strategic viability information 
on going-concern judgment. Prior archival going-concern research (Behn, Kaplan and 
Krumwiede, 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003; and chapter 2 of this dissertation) indicates 
that client operating and strategic actions to address financial distress are important factors 
in going-concern decision-making. More specifically, this literature indicates that 
operating management initiatives generally have a negative impact on auditors’ going-
concern judgment, whereas strategic initiatives that are likely to have a short-term impact 
on liquidity generally have a positive impact on auditors’ going-concern judgment. 
Although these studies provide evidence of a significant effect of strategic and operating 
initiatives on going-concern judgment, they do not explain how these initiatives impact the 
auditor’s going-concern judgment. That is, this literature does not indicate whether the 
strategic performance of the company has a significant direct effect on the auditor’s 
going-concern decision or whether it merely impacts going-concern judgment indirectly 
by changing the interpretative framework for financial information. Therefore the purpose 
of this study is to assess the strength of the direct and indirect relations between 
management actions, auditors’ consideration of financial going-concern evidence and 
going-concern judgment. We further consider how and to what extent these relations 
change when going-concern decision-making is performed by an experienced auditor 
versus a novice auditor. 
Understanding the direct and indirect effect of management actions on auditors’ 
viability judgment is important in the light of the introduction of the business risk audit 
methodology in most large accounting firms. Auditors who use this business risk audit 
approach conduct a strategic viability assessment, which provides a thorough 
understanding of the client’s strategy to obtain a competitive advantage within its business 
environment and the risks that threaten the attainment of its business objectives (Bell, 
Marrs, Solomon and Thomas, 1997). This strategic assessment is likely to influence 
auditor expectations about the client’s operating results and financial condition, and as 
such may impact auditors’ evaluation of audit evidence. In this study, we assess how the 
implementation of operating and strategic actions to mitigate financial problems changes 
the interpretative framework for subsequent financial information, which in turn might 
lead to a change in auditors’ consideration of financial going-concern evidence.  
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The findings indicate that strategic turnaround initiatives which generate positive 
cash flows in the short run are likely to have an overall positive impact on going-concern 
judgment. This is consistent with the results from chapter 2, which show that this type of 
initiatives is perceived by auditors as a mitigating factor. Furthermore, the investigation of 
direct and indirect effects indicate that (a) strategic initiatives which generate short-term 
cash inflows have a positive direct effect on the going-concern decision and (b) operating 
and strategic turnaround initiatives both have a negative indirect effect on experienced 
auditors’ going-concern decision. These results suggests that management turnaround 
initiatives do not only impact auditors’ going-concern decision directly, but also influence 
going-concern decision-making indirectly by changing auditors’ evaluation of subsequent 
financial information. Moreover, we find that the latter effect is different for experienced 
and inexperienced auditors. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 is devoted to our 
research framework. In Section 3.3 we develop our hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the 
research method and section 3.5 presents the results. In section 3.6, we summarize and 
conclude the study. 
 
 
3.2 RESEARCH  FRAMEWORK 
 
As previously mentioned, certain large audit firms have designed and implemented 
a business risk audit approach, which has a top-down, holistic, business risk orientation. 
Under this new audit approach, “understanding the client’s business” is critical. Therefore, 
a formal analysis of the entity’s strategy and whether it can be achieved is considered to be 
an important step in the financial statement audit process. More specifically, the business 
risks that threaten the achievement of the client’s strategy are identified along with the 
responses of the client to such risks. This makes strategic performance information 
particularly salient when judging business viability. However, it is not clear whether 
strategic performance directly affects the going-concern judgment or whether it merely 
has an indirect effect by changing the processing of subsequent financial information. 
Our investigation of the potential indirect effect of strategic performance on going-
concern judgment is motivated by prior business risk audit research, which suggests that 
the holistic perspective that auditors acquire when evaluating their client’s strategic  
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viability impacts the auditor’s evaluation of subsequent evidence. For example, a study by 
Ballou, Earley and Rich (2004) suggests that an auditor’s evaluation of a client’s strategic 
positioning affects the processing of subsequent information regarding the underlying 
business processes. More specifically, the results of this study show that when the 
auditor’s strategic assessment is unfavorable, subsequent business information is 
processed more thoroughly and auditors are more likely to identify whether a risk-
increasing item is present or absent. When we apply this finding to a going-concern 
decision-making context, we expect auditors’ evaluation of client strategic and operating 
initiatives before processing going-concern evidence to impact auditors’ attention for 
going-concern risk factors. As such, client strategic and operating initiatives would not 
only affect going-concern judgment directly, but also indirectly through the processing of 
subsequent going-concern evidence. 
In our research model, we also consider the impact of audit experience on auditors’ 
consideration of client operating and strategic initiatives to mitigate adverse conditions. 
This is motivated by prior research which indicates that an experienced auditor’s 
information acquisition process generally aims at getting a thorough understanding of the 
client, the nature of its business etc. (Biggs, Mock and Watkins, 1988; Biggs, Selfridge 
and Krupka, 1993). Furthermore, research has shown that experienced auditors attend 
more to mitigating going-concern information than inexperienced auditors (Choo and 
Trotman, 1991; Hoffman, Joe and Moser, 2003). This suggests that experienced auditors 
may attach more importance to client operating and strategic turnaround initiatives, 
relative to novice auditors. 
In order to assess the impact of strategic performance on the auditor’s going-
concern judgment, we varied client turnaround initiatives among experimental conditions. 
Consistent with the strategy literature (e.g. Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Barker and 
Duhaime, 1997; Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001) our research design distinguishes between 
operating management actions, which focus on internal, operating problems of firms, and 
strategic management initiatives which aim to solve external, strategic problems. 
Consequently, participants in the OPERATING condition receive case material indicating 
that the client attempts to mitigate financial problems through the implementation of 
operating management initiatives such as cost-cutting. In contrast, participants in the 
STRATEGIC condition were provided with case material indicating that the client 
attempts to restore profitability by implementing strategic management initiatives that are  
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likely to have a short-term cash flow effect such as forming alliances with other firms. In 
order to assess the net effect of different strategic initiatives, we compare auditor 
judgments in the OPERATING and STRATEGIC conditions to a CONTROL condition 
where participants received no information regarding current operating or strategic 
initiatives.  
In accordance with prior going-concern literature, we measure participants’ 
attention to going-concern evidence items by collecting cues recalled (e.g. Choo and 
Trotman, 1991; Tan, 1995; Rau and Moser, 1999; Hoffman et al., 2003). This is based on 
the assumption that recall of different types of audit evidence can be seen as a proxy for 
selective attention for audit evidence (Tan, 1995). The ideas addressed in this study are 
presented in figure 3.1. 
 
FIGURE  3.1: HYPOTHESIZED RELATION BETWEEN CLIENT STRATEGIC INITIATIVES, EXPERIENCE, 





3.3 HYPOTHESES  DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.3.1  Direct effect of management initiatives on going-concern judgment 
 
The first set of hypotheses deals with the direct impact of management initiatives 
on going-concern judgment. Hypothesizing a direct link between management initiatives 
and going-concern judgment is motivated by the fact that US and Belgian auditing 
standards explicitly require auditors to consider non-financial matters and mitigating 
management plans when making a going-concern decision. Moreover, both auditing 
                    
 
          
 






    
       
  
 
    Management initiatives  
Going-concern judgment     Memory for financial  
going-concern evidence  
 Operating    
  
Strategic   
  
  
E    
X   
P    
E    
R   
I    
E    
N   
C   
E    
      Neutral    
  42
standards give examples of operating (e.g. cost-cutting initiatives), as well as strategic 
(e.g. loss of a key franchise or license) factors as potentially useful going-concern 
evidence. This strongly suggests that auditors take into account the mitigating or 
aggravating impact of operating and strategic management initiatives on client viability 
when making a going-concern decision. 
Our prediction of the directional effect that operating and strategic management 
actions have on going-concern decision-making is based on the strategic literature with 
respect to the relationship between successful turnaround and management 
implementation of operating and strategic initiatives. Overall, the evidence from the 
strategy literature suggests that strategic initiatives generally are associated with 
successful company turnaround. Barker and Duhaime (1997), for example, show that 
when a company’s decline is firm based, recovering firms implement more extensive 
strategic changes. In addition, research by Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) indicates that firms 
recovering from financial distress typically adopt more forward-looking, expansionary and 
external marker focused strategies that non-recovery firms. Prior studies with respect to 
the efficacy of operating initiatives mainly focused on retrenchment activities and yielded 
mixed results (see, for example, Robbins and Pearce II, 1992; Barker and Mone, 1994; 
Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001). This indicates that operating turnaround initiatives per se may 
be inadequate, given that a distressed firm’s problems often relate to its strategic 
positioning (Barker and Duhaime, 1997). 
Consistent with the strategic literature regarding the efficacy of different 
management initiatives, recent going-concern research by Behn et al. (2001), Geiger and 
Rama (2003) and chapter 2 of this dissertation indicates that operating initiatives such as 
cost-cutting generally increase the likelihood that a going-concern opinion is issued, 
whereas strategic initiatives with a short-term impact on performance such as strategic 
alliances decrease the likelihood that a going-concern report is issued.  In other words, 
auditors are likely to perceive the engagement in strategic initiatives that are likely to have 
a short-term impact as mitigating factors, whereas operating initiatives are likely to be 
perceived as additional going-concern risk factors. This leads to our first set of 
hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1A: For financially distressed companies, the implementation of operating 
turnaround initiatives has a negative direct effect on auditors’ going-concern judgment.  
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HYPOTHESIS 1B: For financially distressed companies, the implementation of strategic 
turnaround initiatives that are likely to generate positive short-term cash flows has a 
positive direct effect on auditors’ going-concern judgment. 
 
3.3.2  Indirect effect of management initiatives on going-concern judgment 
through memory for financial going-concern evidence 
 
According to SAS No. 59, the auditor should evaluate conditions or events 
discovered during the engagement that raise questions about the appropriateness of the 
going-concern concept. However, the standard does not prescribe the execution of 
separate audit procedures solely to identify potential going-concern problems. The results 
of auditing procedures designed and performed to achieve other audit objectives should be 
sufficient for that purpose. This is consistent with the view of Asare (1992), who notes 
that the going-concern task typically is performed contemporaneously with other tasks. In 
addition, Rau and Moser (1999) argue that going-concern decisions are typically memory-
based because auditors are unlikely to be able to simultaneously perform another audit 
task and process going-concern information. They argue that auditors rather store the 
going-concern information in long-term memory for subsequent retrieval when making a 
viability judgment. 
Given that an auditor’s going-concern judgment is likely to be based at least 
partially on information retrieved from memory, an interesting research question would be 
whether an auditor’s memory for going-concern evidence is impacted by the firm’s 
strategic performance. In other words, given that an audit assignment typically starts with 
a risk assessment, which under the business risk audit approach entails a thorough 
strategic analysis of the client, it is important to investigate whether this “top-down” 
processing of information influences memory for going-concern evidence and thus 
subsequent judgment. 
In order to predict the influence of initial strategic viability judgments on the 
processing of subsequent audit evidence, we consider the results of prior audit research 
that focuses on the impact of initial hypotheses on subsequent information search and 
processing. A substantial part of these studies investigates the existence of confirmatory 
bias in information acquisition and evaluation.   
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One of the first studies to investigate the importance of initial hypotheses on 
subsequent information search was conducted by Kida (1984). She investigated 
experimentally whether auditors attend more to confirmatory evidence, disconfirmatory 
evidence, or equal amounts of both when testing a hypothesis. The results indicate that the 
hypothesis framing had some impact on the information acquisition process, although the 
confirmatory effect was less powerful than suggested in the psychological literature. 
Subsequent research by Trotman and Sng (1989) in a going-concern decision-making 
context found only weak support for the confirmatory bias as it was dominated by a 
preference for negative going-concern information. These findings were corroborated by 
other studies that focused on confirmatory bias in auditors’ information search strategies 
(see, for example, Butt and Campbell, 1989; Anderson and Kida, 1994). In contrast, a 
more recent study by Brown, Peecher and Solomon (1999) indicated that auditors do 
exhibit confirmatory tendencies when their incentives reward efficiency instead of 
effectiveness.  
In this study, our focus will be on confirmation/disconfirmation proneness in 
information  processing, rather than in information acquisition. Early experimental 
research on this topic by Ashton and Ashton (1988) in simplified audit settings showed 
that auditors reacted more to evidence that disconfirmed their current beliefs. Tubbs and 
Messier (1990) tested auditors’ confirmation proneness in more realistic content-rich audit 
settings. Their results reinforced the findings of Ashton and Ashton (1988). Consistent 
with these findings, a study by Asare (1992) that focused on auditors’ evaluation of 
evidence in a going-concern decision-making context indicated that auditors are prone to 
recency effects but not to confirmation bias. However, a study on hypotheses generation in 
analytical procedures by Bedard and Biggs (1991) indicated that auditors exhibited 
confirmatory behavior in their evaluation of audit evidence. Similar results were found in 
a study by Church (1991) that focused on the relationship between commitment to a 
hypothesis and auditors’ evaluation of evidence. McMillan and White (1993) explain these 
seemingly contradictory findings by noting that in the latter studies participants were 
allowed to generate their own expectations instead of being furnished with an initial 
anchor. Subsequent going-concern research by Tan (1995) confirmed that auditors with 
self-generated expectations paid significantly more attention to consistent facts than 
inconsistent facts, compared to auditors who were provided with an initial anchor. These 
findings are in line with the results of Church (1991), showing that auditors who were  
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strongly committed to their initial hypotheses attached more information to confirming 
evidence than auditors who were not strongly committed to their initial hypotheses.  
These findings with respect to auditors’ processing of confirming and 
disconfirming evidence are consistent with the Associative Network Model from social 
psychology literature. This model provides an explanation for the impact of “expectancy-
driven” or “top-down” processing on memory and judgment. The Associative Network 
Model is based on a number of principles. First, expectancy-congruent information will be 
particularly well remembered because it is more strongly associated (by means of 
associative networks) with the target than is expectancy-incongruent information. Second, 
expectancy-incongruent information is not filtered or ignored, but may rather be 
extensively processed as it is thought about in relation to the target and in relation to the 
other information known about the target. The outcome of this “elaborative” processing of 
expectancy-incongruent information is that incongruent information is likely, at least in 
some cases, to be particularly well recalled, often even better than expectancy-congruent 
information (Stangor and McMillan, 1992). However, the latter effect is subject to several 
theoretical moderator variables. Higgins and Bargh (1987) suggested that it is stronger 
when people are initially forming impressions than when they are testing confidently held 
impressions. Meta-analysis confirmed this suggestion, showing that the inconsistency 
advantage in recall is diminished or even reversed when expectations are strong, the 
information to be processed is complex or processing time is limited. 
When we apply this model to our research, we expect that the bias towards 
disconfirming evidence is mitigated because going-concern decision-making is complex in 
nature and auditors develop a relatively solid beginning anchor through the processing of 
client strategic information. Consequently, we expect that auditors will subsequently focus 
on expectancy-congruent information, rather than expectancy-incongruent information. 
This means that auditors will be likely to focus more on positive information when their 
client implements strategic turnaround initiatives that generate short-term cash inflows, 
and more on negative information when their client implements operating turnaround 
initiatives. 
 
HYPOTHESIS  2A:  When the client implements operating turnaround initiatives, more 
negative financial going-concern information items will be recalled. 
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HYPOTHESIS  2B:  When the client implements strategic turnaround initiatives that are 
likely to generate positive short-term cash flows, more positive financial going-concern 
information items will be recalled. 
 
3.3.3  The impact of auditor experience on attention for client strategic and 
operating information 
 
Prior empirical auditing expertise research has indicated significant differences 
between experienced and inexperienced auditors with respect to knowledge, problem 
solving behavior and decision quality (Bédard and Chi, 1993). First of all, experts are able 
to perform more efficiently and effectively because they have more declarative 
knowledge. For example, prior research has shown that experts have superior knowledge 
of (1) different types and frequencies of financial statement errors (Libby and Frederick, 
1990; Tubbs, 1992; Nelson, 1993), (2) internal controls (Frederick, 1991); and (3) 
relations between control weaknesses and errors (Frederick and Libby, 1986). In addition 
to having more knowledge, experienced auditors also have more developed knowledge 
structures than inexperienced auditors (see, for example, Choo and Trotman, 1991; 
Frederick, 1991; Tubbs, 1992; Christ, 1993; Frederick, Heiman-Hoffman and Libby, 
1994; Vera-Muñoz, Kinney and Bonner, 2001). These differences in knowledge structures 
are particularly relevant to this study because they determine the information to be 
encoded and retrieved from memory. Prior auditing research with respect to the 
differences in knowledge structures between experts and novices suggests that experts 
organize their problem representations around the functional features or “deep structure” 
of a problem, whereas novices focus on the surface features of a problem (Bédard and Chi, 
1993; Christ, 1993). For example, Libby and Frederick (1990) show that expert auditors’ 
knowledge of financial statement errors is organized around a well defined transaction-
cycle dimension, while novices do not have this dimension to organize their knowledge of 
financial statement errors. Davis (1996) also found that experienced auditors apply a top-
down approach to select relevant information and as such exhibit a holistic picture of the 
situation. In addition, the results of a study by Biggs, Mock and Watkins (1988) regarding 
the analytical review process indicated that there is a difference between managers and 
seniors in terms of the goals underlying the information acquisition process. The senior’s 
information acquisition was strictly oriented towards obtaining the information needed to  
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perform the task assigned. While this goal was also important to the managers, much of 
their information acquisition activity was directed at getting a thorough understanding of 
the client, the nature of its business, and any business problems it faced. Consistent with 
this finding, a study by Biggs et al. (1993) that focused on the going-concern decision, 
provided evidence that experienced auditors have extensive knowledge of their client’s 
operations, industry, and world events that affected their client’s financial problems. 
Causal reasoning based on event knowledge played a critical role in determining whether 
a financial problem was significant and whether client management plans would mitigate 
the problem.  
Prior research of the effect of auditor experience on going-concern decision-
making also indicated that the well-developed knowledge structures of experienced 
auditors help them to consider not only information that is typical for a company with 
going-concern problems, but also information that is atypical, such as mitigating going-
concern evidence items (Choo and Trotman, 1991; Hoffman et al., 2003). This can be 
explained by the fact that experts’ superior organization of knowledge results in a greater 
capacity to process relevant information. This increased processing capacity allows 
experts to attend more to atypical information that requires additional processing (Fiske, 
Kinder and Larter, 1983). In the same line of reasoning, Hoffman et al. (2003) argue that 
as repeated performance of the going-concern judgment leads to the routinization of basic 
aspects of the task (such as the evaluation of financial information), more processing 
capacity will be free for performing the more cognitively demanding parts of the task (i.e. 
attending to and integrating nonfinancial mitigating information. This will allow 
experienced auditors to search and process more information related to client turnaround 
initiatives, which leads to our third hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3:  Client operating and strategic turnaround initiatives will have a greater 









3.4.1 Experimental  design 
 
To test these hypotheses, the study employs a 3 x 2 design with strategic initiatives 
(OPERATING, STRATEGIC, CONTROL) and level of experience (HIGH, LOW) as two 
independent factors. Client strategic initiatives were manipulated by providing participants 
in the STRATEGIC and OPERATING conditions with a brief overview of current 
initiatives and realisations, reflecting respectively an operating or strategic turnaround 
approach. Participants in the CONTROL condition received no information with respect 
to current strategic initiatives. The second variable manipulated is auditor experience, 
where auditing students are considered to be novice auditors and audit managers and 
partners are considered to be experienced auditors. 
The two dependent variables collected were: (1) participants’ going-concern 
judgments and (2) cues recalled. We collected cues recalled as a measure of participants’ 
attention to going-concern evidence (e.g. Choo and Trotman, 1991; Libby and Trotman, 
1993; Tan, 1995; Phillips, 1999; Rau and Moser, 1999). We use the proportion of positive 
cues recalled (i.e. the number of positive cues recalled divided by the sum of positive and 
negative cues recalled) as a proxy for relative attention because it has the advantage of 
adjusting for any differences in the total number of positive and negative cues recalled 
across experimental conditions (Hoffman et al., 2003). 
 
3.4.2 Materials  and  procedures 
 
3.4.2.1  Case material 
We developed a going-concern judgment case based on the 10-K filings of a 
financially distressed Canadian food retail company. The case reflected a company “at the 
margin”, one that could steer the participants toward either a positive or a negative going-
concern decision.  The case materials were designed in close collaboration with a Big 4 
auditing partner, who reviewed the case for reality and provided pertinent advice. 
Case materials were delivered through a web-based information system. Each 
participant received an email containing a web address and a unique registration code. The  
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participants were also provided with the opportunity to request a copy of the results of the 
study. 
 
3.4.2.2  Experimental procedure 
The experimental task consisted of six parts. More specifically, the participants 
were asked to: (1) read company information, (2) complete a demographic questionnaire, 
(3) perform a recall task, (4) make a going-concern judgment, (5) make a strategic 
viability assessment, and (6) complete a debriefing questionnaire. We made sure that the 
participants could not look ahead to subsequent parts or return to parts completed 
previously. This was accomplished by disabling for all web pages used in this experiment 
most of the navigation buttons and controls normally provided across the top of the screen 
by an Internet browser.  
In the first phase of the experiment, participants were assigned to one of the three 
treatment conditions and were asked to assume the role of the newly appointed auditor of 
a large food retail company. They were asked to read the company information carefully 
because it would be used in subsequent judgment questions. The provided company 
information consisted of (1) company background and vision, (2) financial ratios for the 
previous and current year, (3) unaudited balance sheet and income statement for the 
current year, (4) audited balance sheet and income statement for the previous year, (5) 
actual and forecasted profit and cash flow, and (6) information regarding debt covenant 
compliance.  In the STRATEGIC and OPERATING condition, participants received 
additional information indicating that the company engaged into strategic alliances with 
other companies (STRATEGIC) or implemented a cost cutting plan (OPERATING) in 
order to increase cash flow and restore earnings and sales growth (see appendix 3.1 for an 
overview of the information contained in the section “current strategic initiatives and 
realisations”). In both conditions, the case material indicated that the current management 
actions were expected to increase net income by 30 million dollar. The participants in the 
CONTROL condition did not receive any information with respect to current strategic 
initiatives. The responses of these participants provide a baseline against which the 
responses of the participants in the STRATEGIC and OPERATING condition can be 
compared. 
In the second phase of the experiment, participants were asked to fill in a 
demographic questionnaire related to their auditing background. The participants were  
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asked to provide information with respect to their level of responsibility within the firm, 
the number of years of audit experience, the number of food retail clients audited in the 
past four years, and their industry specialisation. This questionnaire functioned as a short 
filler (distracter) task. 
The third phase consisted of a recall task in which the participants were asked to 
list all the information they could remember about the company and the financial 
statements. After providing all recalled items, the participants were instructed to indicate 
for each recalled item whether it reflected positively, negatively, or neutral on company 
viability. We asked them to indicate their interpretation of the cues they recalled, because 
research by Moser (1992) has indicated that not the experimenter’s classification 
influences participants’ judgments, but rather the participant’s interpretation of recalled 
information items. 
In the fourth phase of the experiment, participants judged the probability that the 
company would continue as a going-concern. When participants performed their viability 
judgment, they were asked to indicate the probability judgment that the company would 
continue as a going-concern in the coming year on a scale from 0 to 100, with end points 
labelled "Definitely Will Not Continue as a Viable Operation," and "Definitely Will 
Continue as a Viable Operation" (e.g. Asare, 1992; Rau and Moser, 1999; Shelton, 1999; 
Arnold, Collier, Leech and Sutton, 2000; Philips, 2002; Blay, 2005). Additionally, the 
participants were asked to judge their confidence in the going-concern decision on a scale 
from 0 (not confident at all) to 100 (entirely confident). 
In the fifth phase of the experiment, participants were asked to indicate the 
likelihood that the company would be able to execute its strategy successfully on a scale 
from 0 (definitely will not be successful) to 100 (definitely will be successful). They were 
also asked to indicate their confidence in the provided strategic viability assessment. 
In the last phase of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a 
debriefing questionnaire, which assessed their experience in going-concern decision-
making and the extent to which they consider strategic information when assessing a 
company’s ability to continue as a going-concern




Appendix 3.2 lists time registration statistics for the reading of company 
information, the going-concern assessment and strategic viability assessment. We 
performed t-tests for differences in means (not tabulated), which indicated no significant 
differences in time spent on the different tasks between the STRATEGIC, OPERATING 
and CONTROL condition
9. The tests of significant differences between experienced and 
novice auditors indicate that on average, experienced auditors allocated less time to 
reading the general company information (t = 3.07, p = 0.00), the financial ratio 
information (t = 3.54, p = 0.00), the strategic information (t = 2.68, p = 0.01) and the 
financial information (t = 5.27, p = 0.00). This is consistent with prior research, which 
indicates that experienced auditors perform more goal-oriented, directed evaluations of 
evidence, relative to novice auditors (see, for example, Anderson, 1988; Bédard and Chi, 
1993; Biggs et al., 1993; Cuccia and McGill, 2000; Thibodeau, 2003). Furthermore, the 
analysis shows that experienced auditors allocated significantly more time to the 
assessment of the company’s ability to continue as a going-concern (t = 1.86, p = 0.06), 
relative to novice auditors.  
 
TABLE 3.1: FLOW OF TASKS   
 S TRATEGIC             OPERATING          CONTROL 
Phase 1  Read company info: 
•  Business and history 
•  Industry information 
•  Vision and operating 
strategy 
•  Financial ratios 
Read company info: 
•  Business and history 
•  Industry information 
•  Vision and operating 
strategy 
•  Financial ratios 
Read company info: 
•  Business and history 
•  Industry information 
•  Vision and operating  
strategy 
•  Financial ratios 
  •  Current strategic initiatives 
and realisations  
    (strategic alliances) 
•  Current strategic initiatives 
and realisations  
     (cost-cutting) 
 
  •  Financial company 
information 
•  Financial company 
information 
•  Financial company 
information 
Phase 2  Demographic questions  Demographic questions  Demographic questions 
Phase 3  Recall task   Recall task  Recall task 
Phase 4  Going-concern judgment  Going-concern judgment  Going-concern judgment 
Phase 5  Strategic assessment  Strategic assessment  Strategic assessment 




                                                                                                                                                   
8 The descriptive statistics with respect to the consideration of strategic information are not tabulated. On a 
scale from -3 (I consider strategic information to a very small extent) to +3 (I consider strategic information 
to a very large extent), the average rating was 1.38 for experienced auditors and 1.40 for novice auditors. 




Two groups of subjects participated in the experiment: experienced auditors and 
novice auditors. The experienced subjects were auditors at the manager/partner level and 
were recruited from Belgian Big 4 auditing firms. These subjects were selected on the 
basis of discussions with audit firm partners who indicated that they would have sufficient 
experience in going-concern decision-making to perform the task at hand. Of the 89 
auditors that were contacted, 56 responded to all questions and assessments (response rate 
= 63 %). The novice subjects were 54 undergraduate accounting majors who had 
completed an auditing course at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. 
Seven observations were dropped from the sample because the participants 
appeared to have misunderstood the instructions. Another six observations were not 
included because the participants’ recall assignments did not indicate any recall of 
financial information, which strongly suggests that they did not complete the experiment 
in a thorough manner. This resulted in a final sample of 50 experienced and 47 novice 
auditors.  
Table 3.2 reports sample descriptive statistics with respect to audit experience and 
going-concern decision-making experience for the sample of experienced auditors, 
consisting of 19 partners and 31 managers. The statistics in table 1 indicate that, on 
average, the auditors had 13.4 years of audit experience, and audited one retail client in the 
past four years. Furthermore, ten percent of the auditors in the sample were specialized in 
auditing clients from the retail industry. With respect to going-concern decision-making 
experience, the auditors were on average involved in 11.39 going-concern decisions for 
financially distressed clients in the past four years. All of these demographic variables 
were compared between treatments and no significant differences were noted, indicating 
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   (7.38)  (1.01)  (0.35)  (24.68) 
STRATEGIC 17 15.85  0.59  0.06  9.65 
   (2.32)  (1.12)  (0.24)  (6.09) 
NO INFORMATION  18  12.19  1.50  0.11  8.39 
   (1.47)  (3.54)  (0.33)  (7.49) 
TOTAL 50  13.38 0.98  0.10  11.39 





3.5.1  Estimation of the overall effect of strategic and operating 
management initiatives on going-concern judgment 
 
  Before probing deeper into the direct and indirect effect of management initiatives 
on going-concern decision-making, we take a look at the total effect (direct and indirect) 
of management initiatives on going-concern judgment. Based on the findings from the 
archival literature on this topic, we expect to find that strategic initiatives are negatively 
associated with the likelihood that a going-concern opinion is issued, while operating 
turnaround initiatives are positively associated with the likelihood a going-concern 
opinion is issued (see, Behn et al.; 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003; and chapter 2 of this 
dissertation). 
    In order to investigate this overall effect of strategic initiatives on going-concern 
judgment, we performed an analysis of the mean going-concern assessments across 
conditions and estimated a priori contrasts. 
    The results of the contrast analysis in table 3.3 reveal that the going-concern 
judgments in the STRATEGIC condition are significantly more positive than those in the 
CONTROL condition (t = 1.63, p = 0.05, one-tailed). This is consistent with the results 
from chapter 2, which indicate that strategic initiatives with a short-term impact on cash 
flow generally send a positive signal to the auditor and hence decrease the likelihood that  
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a going-concern opinion is issued. Conversely, we find no evidence of a negative effect of 
OPERATING initiatives on going-concern judgment (t = 0.23, p = 0.42, one-tailed). 
 
TABLE 3.3: CONTRAST ANALYSIS FOR COING-CONCERN JUDGMENTS 
Contrasts  Df  t-statistic  p-value* 
STRATEGIC-CONTROL  94  1.63  0.05 
OPERATING-CONTROL  94  0.23  0.42 
* The theory predicts a directional result. Therefore, significance levels are one-tailed  
  
  With respect to the impact of experience on the consideration of strategic 
information (see hypothesis 3), the diagrammed mean going-concern assessments in figure 
3.2 suggest a potentially differential impact of OPERATING initiatives on experienced 
and novice auditors’ going-concern judgment. Although this effect is not significant 
(F(1,91) = 0.74, p = 0.39), the tendencies in figure 3.2 suggest the possibility that 
operating initiatives have a negative impact on experienced auditors’ going-concern 
judgment, which is consistent with the archival literature regarding this topic (Geiger and 
Rama, 2003 and chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
 
FIGURE 3.2: MEAN GOING-CONCERN JUDGMENTS OF EXPERIENCED AND NOVICE AUDITORS IN DIFFERENT       











































3.5.2  Estimation of the direct and indirect effect of strategic and operating 
turnaround initiatives on going-concern judgment 
 
    In this section we decompose the overall effect of management initiatives on 
going-concern judgment into a direct effect and an indirect effect through recall of 
financial evidence. With respect to the direct effect, the first set of hypotheses (H1a and 
H1b) proposes that the implementation of operating turnaround initiatives has a negative 
impact on auditors’ going-concern judgment, whereas the implementation of strategic 
turnaround initiatives has a positive impact on auditors’ going-concern judgment.  
    With respect to the indirect effect through recall of financial evidence, hypothesis 
2a and 2b propose that strategic management initiatives have a positive impact on 
auditors’ proportional recall (i.e. the number of positive financial cues recalled, divided by 
the sum of positive and negative financial cues recalled), whereas operating management 
initiatives have a negative impact on auditors’ proportional recall.  
    In order to estimate the causal path outlined in figure 3.1, we estimate (1) the effect 
of management initiatives on the proportional recall of financial evidence, and (2) the 
impact of management initiatives and proportional recall on going-concern judgment.  
 
3.5.2.1  Effect of turnaround initiatives on proportional recall 
    The impact of management initiatives on proportional recall is estimated using an 
ANOVA model with proportional recall (RECALL) as the dependent variable and 
experience (EX) and management initiatives (MI) as independent factors. Tables 3.4 and 
3.5 report mean proportional recall and going-concern judgments for experienced and 
novice auditors. 
TABLE  3.4:  MEAN NUMBER (STANDARD DEVIATION) OF ITEMS RECALLED, MEMORY MEASURES AND   
GOING-CONCERN JUDGMENTS FOR   EXPERIENCED AUDITORS 
Management 






































   (0.99) (0.91)  (0.64)  (1.59)  (0.28)  (19.50) 
STRATEGIC 17  0.47  0.41  0.88  3.41  0.27  62.65 
   (0.80) (0.62)  (0.78)  (3.40)  (0.32)  (20.01) 
CONTROL 18  0.00  0.39  2.56  2.17  0.50  59.39 
   (0.00) (0.61)  (2.45)  (1.89)  (0.38)  (19.95) 
TOTAL 50  0.42  0.46  1.36  2.94  0.32  58.78 
   (0.78) (0.71)  (1.80)  (2.04)  (0.35)  (19.77)  
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TABLE  3.5:  MEAN NUMBER (STANDARD DEVIAITON) OF ITEMS RECALLED, MEMORY MEASURES AND 
GOING-CONCERN JUDGMENTS FOR INEXPERIENCED AUDITORS 
Management 






































   (1.41)  (1.03)  (1.24)  (2.07)  (0.36)  (22.78) 
STRATEGIC 17  0.88  0.24  1.18  3.12  0.30  69.41 
   (0.93)  (0.56)  (1.01)  (1.65)  (0.27)  (13.21) 
CONTROL 17  0.35  0.41  0.82  3.12  0.24  57.76 
   (0.79)  (0.62)  (0.95)  (2.57)  (0.30)  (18.21) 
TOTAL 47  0.77  0.43  1.06  2.94  0.29  63.13 
   (1.07)  (0.74)  (1.05)  (2.11)  (0.31)  (18.36) 
 
  
    The estimation results of the ANOVA in table 3.6 indicate that the impact of 
management initiatives on the proportional recall of financial evidence depends on the 
level of experience of the auditor (F(2,94)=3.95, p = 0.02). Additional analysis (not 
tabulated) indicates that for novice auditors, proportional recall in the CONTROL 
condition was not statistically different from proportional recall in the OPERATING 
condition (F(1,91) = 0.91, p = 0.37) or STRATEGIC condition (F(1,91) = 0.37, p = 0.54). 
For experienced auditors, however, proportional recall of positive financial information in 
the CONTROL condition was significantly higher than in the OPERATING condition 
(F(1,91) = 8.95, p = 0.00) and STRATEGIC condition (F(1,91) = 4.40, p = 0.04). This 
indicates that the indirect effect of management turnaround initiatives on the going-
concern decision is likely to be negative for experienced auditors. 
    One possible explanation for this finding is that experienced auditors may have 
performed an evaluation of the adequacy of implemented operating and strategic 
management initiatives in light of the financial problems of the firm. This may have 
resulted in a more detailed analysis of the financial problems of the firm, which in turn 
influenced the identification and recall of financial going-concern risk items. 
    Another potential explanation might be that auditors, who were informed of the 
fact that the client was in the process of implementing management initiatives to restore 
company performance, were more sensitive to financial distress signals when evaluating 
client financial information. This is in line with recent research by Earley (2002) and 
Ballou et al. (2004), showing that differences in initial client expectations might impact 
the cognitive processing of subsequent information. 
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TABLE 3.6: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PROPORTIONAL RECALL 
Source of Variation  Df  F-value  P-value 
Main Effects  







    Management initiatives (MI)     2  1.08  0.34 
Interaction 







p-values are from two-sided tests 
 
3.5.2.2  Effect of turnaround initiatives and proportional recall on going-concern 
judgment 
    Second, we assess the effect of both proportional recall and management initiatives 
on going-concern judgment by performing an ANCOVA with going-concern judgment as 
dependent variable, and experience, management initiatives and recall as independent 
variables. The level of significance of the recall and management initiatives measures will 
indicate whether management initiatives impact going-concern judgment directly, 
indirectly, or both. The results of the ANCOVA in table 3.7 indicate that going-concern 
judgments are primarily based on auditors’ recall of financial information (F(1,90) = 
10.24, p = 0.00) and to a lesser extent on strategic information (F(2,90) = 2.39, p = 0.10).  
 
TABLE  3.7: ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR GOING-CONCERN JUDGMENTS       
Source of Variation  Df  F-value  P-value 
Main Effects  







    Management initiatives (MI)     2  2.39  0.10 
Interaction 















p-values are from two-sided tests 
 
Additional analysis (not tabulated) indicates that the significance of the 
management initiatives measure is attributable to the positive effect of strategic 
management initiatives on going-concern judgement (F(1,90) = 4.19, p = 0.04) and not to 
the negative effect of operating initiatives (F(1,90) = 0.08, p = 0.77).   This means that our 
findings support hypothesis 1b, which predicts that strategic initiatives have a positive 
direct effect on going-concern judgment. Our findings, however, do not support 
hypothesis 1a, which states that operating initiatives have a negative direct effect on 
going-concern decision-making. With respect to the indirect effect of management 
initiatives on going-concern judgment, we predicted that the implementation of operating  
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initiatives would have a negative effect on proportional recall (hypothesis 2a), while 
strategic initiatives which are likely to generate a short-term cash-flow effect would have a 
positive effect on proportional recall (hypothesis 2b). Our analyses, however, indicate that 
the implementation of both types of management turnaround initiatives have a negative 
indirect effect on auditor’s going-concern judgment through a significantly lower 
proportional recall of positive going-concern evidence items. This result provides support 
for hypothesis 2a, but contradicts hypothesis 2b. Finally, hypothesis 3 predicted that 
management turnaround initiatives would have a greater impact on going-concern 
decision-making for experienced auditors. Our results indicate that the indirect effect of 
management turnaround initiatives is indeed more pervasive for experienced auditors, 
although the direct effect is not stronger for experienced auditors. 
In sum, the results of this study are supportive of the finding in chapter 2 that 
strategic initiatives that are likely to generate short-term positive cash flows decrease the 
likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion. This is consistent with evidence from the 
strategic literature indicating that strategic networks often have positive effects on 
corporate performance (see, for example, Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Stuart, 
2000) Moreover, we find that the negative impact of operating initiatives on auditors’ 
going-concern judgment as reported in Geiger and Rama (2003) and chapter 2 of this 
dissertation is likely to be due to the negative indirect effect of these initiatives on going-
concern decision-making. In particular, the results suggest that the presence of 
management turnaround initiatives increases experienced auditors’ recall of negative 
financial information and decreases auditors’ recall of positive information. 
 
3.5.3 Supplementary  analysis 
 
3.5.3.1  Industry experience and auditors’ evaluation of turnaround strategies 
In chapter 4 of this dissertation, we report that the effect of management initiatives 
on the going-concern decision for soon-to be bankrupt companies is different for industry 
specialists, compared to non-specialist auditors (see infra). More specifically, the results of 
this chapter indicate that the likelihood of Type II errors (i.e. issuing a clean opinion for a 
client that subsequently goes bankrupt) is lower if a soon-to-be bankrupt company that 
implements an operating turnaround approach is audited by an industry specialist.   
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To investigate the impact of industry experience on auditors’ evaluation of 
turnaround initiatives, we reperformed our analysis for the subsample of experienced 
auditors using the number of retail clients audited in the last four years (RETAILEXP) as 
a measure of industry experience. We performed this analysis using regression analysis 
instead of ANOVA, because ANOVA does not allow for the estimation of interaction 
terms when one of the interaction variables is continuous.  We defined the variables 
OPERATING and STRATEGIC as dummy variables that are coded one if the company 
implemented operating or strategic turnaround initiatives, respectively. Consistent with the 
previous analysis, we estimated (1) the effect of turnaround initiatives (OPERATING, 
STRATEGIC) on proportional recall (RECALL), and (2) the effect of both turnaround 
initiatives (OPERATING, STRATEGIC) and proportional recall (RECALL) on going-
concern judgment (GC). In addition, both regression models tested interaction effects 
between management turnaround initiatives and retail experience.  
The results from Model 1 in table 3.8 indicate that the participants in the 
OPERATING condition had a significantly lower proportional recall of positive financial 
information, compared to the STRATEGIC and CONTROL condition. The estimation 
results from model 2 indicate that proportional recall is significantly associated with the 
going-concern decision, which is consistent with our previous results.  
 
TABLE  3.8: THE EFFECT OF INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE ON AUDITORS’ EVALUATION OF TURNAROUND 
STRATEGIES 
Variables    Model 1           Model 2 
    Dep. Var. = RECALL             Dep. Var. = GC 
    coeff.  t-ratio  p-value    coeff.  t-ratio      p-value
                
C     0.47  4.79 0.0000   55.33  9.313  0.0000
OPERATING    -0.37 -3.23 0.0023   -5.85  -0.65  0.5166
STRATEGIC   -0.17  -1.39 0.1706   -1.06  -0.15  0.8817
RETAILEXP     0.02  1.31 0.1968   -2.67  -2.90  0.0058
OPERATING *RETAILEXP     0.06  0.64 0.5241    4.55  1.01  0.3195
STRATEGIC *RETAILEXP    -0.06  -0.81 0.4235    9.41  3.14  0.0031
RECALL        16.06  1.93  0.0596
             
Adjusted R
2    0.11        0.10 
t-statistics are calculated using White’s correction for heteroskedasticity 
p-values are from two-sided tests 
 
The results further indicate that, on average, going-concern ratings are significantly 
lower for auditors with more retail experience. Interestingly, the results also indicate that 
the impact of STRATEGIC initiatives on going-concern judgment is influenced by the  
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auditor’s retail experience. More specifically, going-concern judgments for clients in the 
STRATEGIC condition are more positive when the auditor has more retail experience.  
This means that for experienced auditors, the positive effect of STRATEGIC initiatives on 
going-concern decision-making is especially prevalent for auditors with extensive retail 
experience. 
 
3.5.3.2  Years of audit experience and auditors’ evaluation of turnaround strategies 
In order to refine our analysis with respect to the effect of auditor experience on 
the evaluation of strategic and operating management plans in a going-concern decision-
making context, we reperformed our analysis for the subsample of experienced auditors 
using years of auditor experience (AUDITEXP) as an experience measure. Note further 
that the analysis is conducted in the same manner as the previous supplemental analysis. 
Model 1 estimates the effect of turnaround initiatives (OPERATING, STRATEGIC) on 
proportional recall (RECALL), whereas model 2 assesses the effect of both turnaround 
initiatives (OPERATING, STRATEGIC) and proportional recall (RECALL) on going-
concern judgment (GC).  
The results in table 3.9 indicate that, in contrast to the previous analyses, 
management turnaround initiatives have no indirect effect on auditors’ going-concern 
judgment. Although the implementation of OPERATING initiatives has a significantly 
negative impact on proportional recall, there is no significant association between 
proportional recall and the auditor’s going-concern judgment. With respect to the direct 
effect of management turnaround initiatives on going-concern judgment, the results 
suggest that the implementation of operating turnaround initiatives has a significantly 
negative impact on the auditor’s going-concern opinion. The results furthermore suggest 
that this effect is less pronounced for more experienced auditors. Finally, the analysis 
indicates that the implementation of strategic initiatives is positively valued by more 
experienced auditors, although their going-concern judgment is, on average, less positive 







TABLE 3.9: THE EFFECT OF YEARS OF AUDIT EXPERIENCE ON AUDITORS’ EVALUATION OF TURNAROUND 
STRATEGIES 
Variables    Model 1           Model 2 
    Dep. Var. = RECALL             Dep. Var. = GC 
    coeff.  t-ratio  p-value    coeff.  t-ratio      p-value
                
C      0.53  2.77 0.01     80.52  8.44  0.00 
OPERATING    -0.40 -1.76 0.09    -38.85 -3.11 0.00 
STRATEGIC   -0.42  -1.65 0.11    -17.84 -1.19  0.24 
AUDITEXP    -0.00  -0.12 0.90      -2.26 -3.59  0.00 
OPERATING *AUDITEXP      0.01  0.30 0.76       3.08  3.90  0.00 
STRATEGIC *AUDITEXP      0.01  0.70 0.49       2.03  2.29  0.03 
RECALL          12.70  1.57  0.12 
           
Adjusted R
2    0.09           0.19 
t-statistics are calculated using White’s correction for heteroskedasticity 






In this study, we extend prior archival research that examines the relationship 
between operating and strategic management plans and the auditor’s going-concern 
decision. Recent studies on this topic (Behn et al., 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003; and 
chapter 2 of this dissertation) indicate that operating management actions such as cost-
cutting and strategic initiatives with a short-term impact such as cooperative agreements 
with other firms have a significant impact on going-concern decision-making. We add to 
this body of research by investigating whether those management initiatives impact going-
concern decision-making directly or whether management initiatives affect going-concern 
judgment indirectly through memory for financial evidence. 
In addition, we consider the impact of auditing experience on the consideration of 
strategic and operating management initiatives in the going-concern decision process. This 
is motivated by prior research which indicates that experienced auditors attend more to 
mitigating going-concern information and generally acquire a more thorough 
understanding of the client, the nature of its business etc. Based on these findings, we 
argue that experienced auditors may attach more importance to management turnaround 
initiatives in going-concern decision-making, relative to novice auditors.  
 
    Consistent with the results in chapter 2, our findings indicate that strategic 
management initiatives with a short-term impact on cash flow have an overall positive  
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impact on going-concern judgment. This finding provides additional evidence of the 
auditor’s perception of this type of turnaround initiative as a mitigating factor with respect 
to a company’s financial difficulties.  
    When we decomposed the overall effect of management initiatives on going-
concern judgment into a direct effect and an indirect effect through recall of financial 
evidence, the results reveal that (a) strategic initiatives have a positive direct effect and (b) 
strategic and operating initiatives both have a negative indirect effect for the group of 
experienced auditors. The latter (indirect) effect can be explained by the fact that 
experienced auditors may have evaluated the adequacy of current management initiatives 
in light of the financial problems of the firm. This may have caused them to focus more on 
financial distress signals than auditors in the control condition, resulting in increased recall 
of financial going-concern risk items.  An alternative explanation is that auditors who 
were informed of the fact that the client attempted to restore profitability through the 
implementation of operating or strategic management initiatives, were more sensitive to 
subsequent financial evidence indicating financial distress. Stated differently, it is possible 
that experienced auditors perceived this as an “early warning signal” that the client might 
be in financial distress, which caused auditors to focus more on subsequent financial 
distress indicators.  The presence of this negative indirect effect of management 
turnaround initiatives on auditors’ going-concern judgment might provide an explanation 
for our finding in chapter 2 with respect to the negative impact of operating initiatives on 
the auditor’s going-concern decision.  
  
This study is subject to a number of limitations. The first limitation that applies 
relates to the number of participants (n = 97) in this study.  The small sample size of this 
study is largely due to the fact we required half of the participant group to be audit 
partners or managers.  
A second limitation is that we included auditing students as novice auditors. 
Although these students are familiar with the concept of going-concern decision-making, 
it is very well possible that the absence of audit experience has had an impact on the 
results of this study. This issue might be addressed in future research by including not 
only auditing students and audit partners and managers, but also audit seniors in the 
subject pool.   
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Third, this study considers only the impact of cost-cutting initiatives and strategic 
alliances on going-concern judgment. As the results of the previous chapter suggest that 
alternative turnaround initiatives such as increased marketing efforts or the introduction of 
new products are also likely to have a significant impact on the going-concern decision, it 
would be interesting to analyze the impact of a variety of turnaround initiatives on the 
going-concern decision-making process. 
  A final suggestion for future research relates to the impact of strategic and 
operating information on the information acquisition process. Whereas this study has 
focused mainly on the processing of financial and non-financial information, future 
research might investigate the acquisition of financial and non-financial information in a 




















































CHAPTER 4   
 
THE IMPACT OF AUDITOR INDUSTRY SPECIALISATION,  
AUDIT METHODOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES  




 This study contributes to the literature on audit reporting errors by providing 
evidence on the association between auditor industry specialization, audit methodology 
and the likelihood of Type II reporting errors (i.e. issuing a clean opinion for a client that 
subsequently goes bankrupt). In addition, we investigate whether industry specialisation or 
the implementation of the business risk methodology provides auditors with a comparative 
advantage in judging the adequacy and feasibility of operating and strategic management 
plans to mitigate financial distress.  
The results of this study indicate that the likelihood of Type II errors is higher for 
clients audited by business risk auditors who are not industry specialists. Our findings 
further suggest that this effect is likely to be due to business risk auditors’ evaluation of 
their client’s operating turnaround initiatives. Furthermore, our findings show that Type II 
reporting errors are less likely to occur if a client implementing an operating turnaround 
approach is audited by a specialist auditor. Together, the results of this study suggest that 
an analysis of client strategy per se may not reduce the rate of Type II errors, unless the 
auditor has adequate industry experience to judge the adequacy of client operating 





As discussed in the previous chapters, auditors are held responsible for evaluating 
their client’s going-concern status on every audit engagement. In particular, the auditor 
has to consider whether standard audit procedures identify conditions and events that 
indicate substantial doubt about the client’s ability to stay in business during the next 
twelve months. Over the years, the auditing profession has repeatedly been criticized for 
not providing warning signals for impending client bankruptcy (Raghunandan and Rama, 
1995; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). Moreover, regulators and users often view 
bankruptcies without a prior going-concern report as audit reporting failures (McKeown, 
Mutchler and Hopwood, 1991; Chen and Church, 1992; Geiger and Ragunandan, 2002). 
The frequency of audit reporting errors has been extensively documented in prior audit 
reporting research, indicating that the proportion of bankrupt companies that receive a 
going-concern modified audit opinion in the year immediately preceding bankruptcy is 
generally lower than 50 percent (Chen and Church, 1992; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; 
Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002).  
Prior research that investigated the causes of audit reporting errors focused on a 
variety of  auditor- and client-related factors such as auditor size, auditor tenure, the 
probability of bankruptcy, payments and covenant defaults, bankruptcy lag, industry 
sector etc. (see, for example, McKeown et al., 1991; Mutchler, Hopwood and McKeown, 
1997; Lennox, 1999a and 1999b). We contribute to this line of research by investigating 
the impact of different auditor traits on reporting accuracy. More specifically, we 
investigate the effect of enhanced industry knowledge or a business risk focus on the 
incidence of Type II reporting errors (i.e. issuing a clean opinion for a client that 
subsequently goes bankrupt). In addition, we investigate the comparative advantage of 
industry specialists and business risk auditors in judging the adequacy of their client’s 
initiatives to mitigate adverse conditions. The investigation of these research issues is 
motivated by significant changes in the last decade with respect to the structure and 
methodology of large audit firms.  
More specifically, in the early 1990s, large accounting firms started to structure 
their business around industry sectors and actively began to market their industry 
specialist knowledge (Casterella, Francis, Lewis and Walker, 2004). In the same time 
period, audit firms developed a new audit methodology with a business risk focus, which  
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greatly emphasized auditors’ knowledge of the client’s business and industry (e.g. Bell, 
Marrs, Solomon and Thomas, 1997; Lemon, Tatum and Turley, 2000; Knechel, 2001; 
Bell, Peecher and Solomon, 2005). With respect to the impact of these changes in the 
auditing landscape on auditor reporting accuracy, we note that the association between 
industry specialisation and audit methodology on the one hand and the occurrence of Type 
II errors on the other has never been investigated, although the relationship between 
industry specialisation and audit quality received ample attention in the audit literature 
(see, for example, O’Keefe, King and Gaver, 1994; Owhoso, Messier and Lynch, 2002; 
Balsam, Krishnan and Yang, 2003; Low, 2004).  
Based on the findings from this literature, we hypothesize that the likelihood of 
type II reporting errors is generally lower for clients that are audited by industry 
specialists. In addition, we argue that industry specialists are better able to judge the 
adequacy and feasibility of management turnaround initiatives, relative to non-specialist 
auditors. With respect to the relationship between audit methodology and audit reporting 
accuracy, we formulate two competing hypotheses stating that the likelihood of audit 
reporting errors is lower (higher) for auditors adopting the business risk methodology. 
Moreover, we expect that the effect of management turnaround initiatives on the 
likelihood of type II reporting errors will be different for business risk auditors, relative to 
non-business risk auditors. 
Based on a sample of 101 US companies that went bankrupt in the years 1998-
2001, we find that the likelihood of type II reporting errors is higher when a company is 
audited by a business risk auditor who is not an industry specialist. Furthermore, our 
findings suggest that this effect is likely to be due to business risk auditors’ evaluation of 
operating turnaround initiatives, providing evidence of a significant relationship between a 
business risk auditor’s evaluation of turnaround initiatives and audit reporting accuracy.  
In contrast, our analysis of the relationship between industry specialization, management 
turnaround initiatives and audit reporting accuracy shows that the likelihood of Type II 
reporting errors is lower when a client that implements operating initiatives is audited by 
an industry specialist, which confirms our expectations.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we provide an 
overview of the existing literature with respect to auditor reporting errors and auditor 
industry specialisation. In section 4.3, we motivate our hypotheses. Section 4.4 is devoted 
tot the development of our research methodology. In section 4.5, we outline our sample  
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selection procedure and section 4.6 provides a discussion of the results of our analyses. 
We conclude in section 4.7.  
 
 
4.2 LITERATURE  REVIEW 
 
4.2.1  Audit reporting accuracy 
 
With respect to research regarding audit reporting errors, different classes of 
variables have been proposed and tested in order to explain the occurrence of Type II 
errors in a going-concern context. Early research by McKeown, Mutchler, and Hopwood 
(1991) investigated why auditors often fail to modify the opinions of soon-to-be-bankrupt 
companies, and found that the likelihood of Type II reporting errors is larger when the 
probability of bankruptcy is lower, when the reporting lag is shorter, and when the client is 
larger. In a later study, Mutchler, Hopwood and McKeown (1997) extended this research 
by testing the auditor’s consideration of contrary information and mitigating factors in a 
going-concern decision context using a sample of 208 soon-to-be bankrupt US companies. 
Their results indicate that extreme negative news items reported before the audit-report 
date significantly increases the likelihood of receiving a going-concern audit opinion.  
Lennox (1999a) compared bankruptcy and audit reporting models for a sample of 
976 UK companies in order to help explain why audit reports were not accurate or 
informative signals of bankruptcy. The results indicate that the economic cycle and 
industry sector were important predictors of bankruptcy, although they were not 
significant in the audit reporting model. Second, the going-concern models showed very 
strong persistence in audit reporting, i.e. auditors were reluctant to give first-time 
qualifications or to give clean opinions following qualified reports.  
In a second study, Lennox (1999b) investigated the relationship between auditor 
accuracy and auditor size for a sample of 976 publicly quoted UK companies. Using a 
bankruptcy model to control for differences in client characteristics, this study indicates 
that both Type I and Type II errors are smaller for large audit firms compared to small 
audit firms. 
Hermanson, Hermanson and Carcello (1996) conducted an exploratory study of 
eight multinational audit failures (i.e. multinational client bankruptcy shortly after an  
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unmodified audit opinion) in order to examine the role of multinational risk factors such 
as foreign currency issues, international political and economic risks, greater information 
asymmetry and greater complexity. The results of their study suggest that multinational 
auditing is not inherently different from domestic auditing, which implies that 
multinational risk factors do not play a major role in any of the audit failures. 
Recent research by Casterella, Lewis and Walker (2000) examined Type II 
reporting errors for a sample of 100 US companies by developing an alternative model 
taking into account the resolution of the bankruptcy filing. Their model extends prior 
research by including a bankruptcy resolution variable and an auditor/client relationship 
variable that proxies in part for the auditor’s loss function. Unlike prior opinion prediction 
studies, they use a simultaneous equations method that recognizes the interdependence of 
the auditor’s opinion decision and the ultimate outcome of the soon-to-be bankrupt 
company. Their results show that auditors do not seem to be able to predict bankruptcy 
filing nor resolutions. More specifically, auditors fail to modify the opinion when there 
seems to be more uncertainty about the financial prospects of the company in question. 
Hence unmodified opinions are more likely when companies have higher Z-scores and are 
not in debt default, when the audit report date is closer to year-end, and when there is a 
longer delay between the report date and the filing for bankruptcy. Moreover, the data are 
not consistent with the notion that auditors are more likely to issue an unmodified opinion 
when there is a higher probability of reorganization. With respect to economic incentives 
to avoid or delay the issuance of a modified opinion, the results indicate that auditors are 
less likely to modify the opinion for new clients or for clients that the auditor has for a 
long time. 
Consistent with the results of Casterella et al. (2000) with respect to the impact of 
auditor tenure on Type II errors, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) found for a sample of 
117 US companies entering into bankruptcy during the period 1996-1998 that there were 
significantly more audit reporting errors in the earlier years of the auditor/client 
relationship. In addition, recent research by Knechel and Vanstraelen (2004) shows for a 
sample of 688 Belgian companies that Type I error rates are reduced in long tenure 
situations, whereas Type II errors are no higher. They also find that the results from 
previous research regarding the impact of auditor tenure on audit failure may be due to 
failure to control for firm age, implying a survivorship bias.  
  70
Casterella, Knechel and Walker (2004) went one step further and developed an 
empirical model to predict various types of audit failures (Type II reporting errors, SEC 
Enforecement Actions, and litigation against auditors) based on observed attributes of 
failures in short and long tenure situations. Based on a sample of 174 US companies, their 
results suggest that audit failures are more likely due to incentives for auditor bias in long 
tenure situations and are more likely due to undiscovered fraud in short tenure situations.  
Prior research has also investigated the impact of changes in legislation, reporting 
requirements and/or the auditing environment on auditor reporting behaviour. More 
specifically, Carcello, Hermanson and Huss (1995) investigated the impact of the issuance 
of SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 on the propensity of Big 8/6 firms to issue going-concern 
modified opinions. The analysis was based on a sample of 446 bankrupt US companies 
and provided evidence of an increase in firms’ propensity to modify bankruptcy-related 
opinions after the issuance of SAS No. 34, but not after the issuance of SAS No. 59. In 
contrast, Raghunandan and Rama (1995) found for a sample of 362 non-bankrupt (but 
financially distressed) US companies and 175 bankrupt US companies that after SAS No. 
59 became effective, auditors were more likely to issue going-concern modified opinions 
for financially stressed non-bankrupt companies and for bankrupt companies prior to 
failure. A more recent study of Geiger and Raghunandan (2001) examined the potential 
impact of the Private Securities Reform Act (enacted as law in 1995) on auditor reporting 
by examining audit reports for 383 US bankrupt companies. This research was motivated 
by the fact that the Reform Act reduces the costs associated with litigation against 
auditors. The results indicate that auditors were less likely to issue going-concern 
modified audit reports for soon-to-be bankrupt companies after the Reform Act, thereby 
increasing the incidence of Type II errors. Geiger, Raghunandan and Rama (2005) 
investigated whether auditors became more conservative in their reporting after December 
2001, as a result of a series of high-profile corporate failures. Based on the analysis of 226 
bankrupt companies, they find evidence of a decrease in Type II reporting errors in the 
post-December 2001 period. 
 
4.2.2 Industry  specialisation 
 
A growing body of research investigates the effect of auditor industry 
specialisation on the market for audit services and audit quality.  Prior research with  
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respect to the impact of industry specialisation on the market for audit services has mainly 
focused on the relationship between industry specialisation and the pricing of audit 
services.  Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995) estimated audit fee premia for industry 
specialist Big 8 auditors for a sample of 1484 Australian publicly listed companies. The 
results of their study indicated that industry specialist Big 8 auditors earn a 34% premium 
over nonspecialist Big 8 auditors. Recent research by Ferguson and Stokes (2002) focused 
on the relationship between brand name, industry specialisation and leadership audit 
pricing in the wake of the mergers that created the Big 6 and Big 5 accounting firms. This 
study does not find strong support for the presence of industry specialist premiums in the 
postmerger years and indicates that earlier findings of national market industry specialist 
premiums (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995) should be interpreted with caution.  In a subsequent 
study, Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2003) test whether the audit market prices an 
auditor’s firm-wide industry expertise, or whether the audit market only prices office-level 
expertise in those specific cities where the auditor is the industry leader. The overall 
findings of this study are supportive of the market pricing office-level industry leadership 
in city-specific audit markets.  The importance of office-level industry leadership is also 
emphasized in a more recent study by Francis, Reichelt and Wang (2005), which was 
conducted in the US audit market. Casterella, Francis, Lewis and Walker (2004) 
investigated the relationship between industry specialisation, client bargaining power and 
audit pricing using Porter’s (1985) analysis of a competitive strategy. The results of this 
study are consistent with a differentiation premium for industry specialisation, but only for 
smaller clients having low bargaining power. 
 
The fact that industry specialists earn higher audit fees suggests that they deliver 
higher audit quality. Existing research with respect to the impact of industry specialisation 
on auditors’ judgment and decision-making seems to be supportive of industry knowledge 
leading to increased auditor efficiency and effectiveness. For example, O’Keefe et al. 
(1994) report that industry specialisation is associated with fewer violations of GAAS 
reporting standards. Recent research by Owhoso et al. (2002) shows that auditors working 
within their industry specialisation are more effective at detecting errors in staff work 
papers during the audit review process. Balsam et al. (2003) and Krishnan (2003) 
examined the association between earnings quality and industry specialisation and found 
evidence of specialist auditors reducing earnings management by their clients. More  
  72
recently, a study by Carcello and Nagy (2004) indicates that clients that are audited by 
industry specialists experience less financial statement fraud. In addition, Dunn and 
Mayhew (2004) provide evidence of industry specialist audit firms assisting their clients 
in enhancing corporate disclosure. 
With respect to the link between industry specialisation and knowledge, research 
by Wright and Wright (1997) provides evidence of industry specialists increased ability to 
generate alternative hypotheses when identifying accounting errors. In addition, Solomon, 
Shields, and Whittington (1999) examined industry specialists’ knowledge of error and 
nonerror explanations for unexpected ratio fluctuations and found that industry specialists 
have more knowledge of non-error explanations. 
 
 
4.3 HYPOTHESES  DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prior research on auditor reporting has documented differences in audit quality that 
can be attributed to different classes or groups of auditors. Francis and Krishnan (1999) 
show that Big 6 auditors are more likely to issue modified audit reports for high-accrual 
firms and a study by Lennox (1999b) suggests that Big 4 auditors issue more accurate 
audit reports than non-Big 4 firms. Weber and Willenborg (2003) find that the pre-IPO 
opinions of larger accounting firms are more predictive of post-IPO negative stock 
delistings than smaller accounting firms. Moreover, Gaeremynck and Willekens (2003) 
find in a Belgian context that when financial difficulties are less apparent, as is the case 
for firms that voluntarily decide to liquidate, Big 6 auditors are more likely to issue a non-
clean audit opinion than non-Big 6 auditors. 
In this chapter, we contribute to research focusing on the quality of auditor 
reporting by investigating the impact of industry specialisation and audit methodology on 
the likelihood of Type II errors. As such, we move beyond the Big N/non-Big N 
dichotomy as an indication of audit quality and investigate which auditor traits and audit 
methods are beneficial to audit reporting accuracy. More specifically, we investigate 
whether enhanced industry knowledge or an increased focus on business risk decreases the 
incidence of Type II reporting errors. In addition, we investigate the comparative 
advantage of industry specialists and business risk auditors in judging the adequacy of 
mitigating management actions implemented by financially distressed companies.   
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4.3.1  Auditor industry specialisation and reporting accuracy 
 
Prior research has shown that auditor industry specialization significantly 
contributes to audit quality in the form of fewer violations of GAAS reporting standards 
(O’Keefe et al., 1994), reduced earnings management (Balsam et al., 2003; Krishnan, 
2003), reduced financial statement fraud (Carcello and Nagy, 2004) and enhanced 
corporate disclosure (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004). In addition, research on the merits of 
auditors’ industry-specific experience suggests that auditors develop more extensive 
knowledge of the industry in which they specialize. Krishnan (2003) suggests that 
specialist auditors are likely to develop databases detailing industry-specific best practices, 
industry-specific risks and errors, and unusual transactions, all of which serve to enhance 
overall audit effectiveness. In line with this reasoning, the results of a study by Low 
(2004) suggest that auditors’ knowledge of their client’s industry improves the quality of  
their audit risk assessments. Low (2004) further argues that one of the comparative 
advantages of industry specialist auditors is that their enhanced knowledge of the client’s 
industry enables them to benchmark the client’s performance against its industry. It is 
quite intuitive that in a going-concern decision context, this type of knowledge is 
particularly useful to assess future client viability and could potentially enhance a 
specialist auditor’s reporting decision quality. Hence, we state our first hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The likelihood of Type II reporting errors is lower (ceteris paribus) for 
industry specialist auditors. 
 
4.3.2  Audit methodology and reporting accuracy 
 
As previously mentioned, there has been a significant evolution in the audit 
methodologies of large accounting firms. The new audit approaches apply a holistic 
perspective and emphasize a thorough understanding of the client’s business and business 
risks (e.g. Bell et al, 1997; Bell et al., 2005). This allows auditors to determine the extent 
to which risks are present that threaten the attainment of client strategic objectives and 
hence client strategic viability. Recent research regarding the business risk audit 
methodology provides mixed results with respect to its impact on audit quality. Several 
recent studies indicate that under certain conditions, the business risk methodology may  
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lead to greater audit effectiveness and efficiency (Erickson, Mayhew and Felix, 2000; 
Lemon et al., 2000; Kopp and O’Donnell, 2005; Choy and King, 2005). A study by 
Lemon et al. (2000) investigated the evolution of audit methodologies applied by large 
accounting firms and found that some firms that participated in the study had undertaken a 
fundamental review of how problems arise in audit engagements. These firms stated that 
perceived audit failures are generally not caused by the ineffectiveness of audit procedures 
in detecting misstatements, but are the result of difficulties arising from other aspects of 
the business context (e.g. the impact of rapidly changing business environments, 
globalization and technological advances on the client’s business). Based on this finding, 
we argue that a thorough analysis of the client’s business could potentially decrease the 
likelihood of audit reporting errors because it may enhance auditors’ ability to recognize 
going-concern problems. Knechel (2002) supports this view and argues that going-concern 
decision-making would greatly benefit from a broad examination of risk and risk 
management, as described in the business risk auditing methodology. This evidence 
indicates that the business risk methodology may have a positive effect on audit reporting 
accuracy, which leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
HYPOTHESIS  2A:  The likelihood of Type II audit reporting errors is lower (ceteris 
paribus) for clients that appointed a business risk auditor. 
 
On the other hand, a number of recent studies cast doubt on the positive effect of 
the business risk methodology on audit quality. A study by Ballou, Earley and Rich (2004) 
examined the effect of strategic information on the auditor’s judgment about business-
process performance. Their results suggest that when strategic-positioning information 
indicates that the client is in line with industry norms, information regarding a small 
problem in a business process will be weighted less than when the strategic-positioning 
information indicates that the client is trailing industry norms. This difference in 
processing when strategic-level information is favorable may have a negative impact on 
auditor judgment quality when problems are present within a business process as these 
risk increasing items might be underweighted. 
Moreover, the findings of a study by O’Donnell and Schultz (2005) indicate that 
auditors who perform a strategic analysis of their client and develop favorable strategic 
risk assessments are less likely to adjust account-level risk assessments for inconsistent  
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fluctuations in accounts, even though strategic risk had no direct implications for 
fluctuations in these accounts. Hence, O’Donnell and Schultz (2005) conclude that 
auditors may underestimate the risk of financial misstatement when they assess strategic 
risks at lower levels. Both studies (Ballou et al., 2004; and O’Donnell and Schultz, 2005) 
on auditor judgment in a business risk audit setting suggest that under certain 
circumstances, the performance of a strategic analysis may hinder professional scepticism.  
Based on this research, we formulate a competing hypothesis which states that the 
implementation of the business risk methodology may have a negative impact on audit 
reporting accuracy, leading to an increase in the likelihood of Type II errors: 
 
HYPOTHESIS  2B:  The likelihood of Type II audit reporting errors is higher (ceteris 
paribus) for clients that appointed a business risk auditor. 
 
4.3.3  Industry specialisation, client operating and strategic initiatives and 
reporting accuracy 
 
Industry specialist auditors’ more extensive knowledge of their clients’ industry 
not only enables them to benchmark the client financial performance against industry 
norms (see supra), but also to assess the appropriateness of company strategic initiatives in 
view of current industry trends and market needs. As noted earlier, specialist auditors are 
likely to develop databases detailing industry-specific best practices (Krishnan, 2003), 
allowing them to evaluate management strategic and operating initiatives against optimal 
practices in the industry. In addition, industry specialists are likely to have a profound 
understanding of the external risks that might threaten the attainment of the company’s 
strategic objectives and should be able to judge whether the client’s strategy has addressed 
external forces in the industry such as lifestyle trends, new entrants, regulation, technology 
etc… In this respect, Biggs, Selfridge and Krupka (1993) argue that in a going-concern 
decision context, knowledge of the client’s operations and industry, and events in the 
client’s environment is critical to understanding the causes of financial distress and 
evaluating management’s plans to mitigate financial problems. 
This reasoning leads to our third hypothesis, which suggests that specialist auditors 
are likely to be better informed with respect to the adequacy of management initiatives in 
order to overcome adverse conditions:   
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HYPOTHESIS 3: Strategic and operating management initiatives decrease the likelihood of 
Type II reporting errors (ceteris paribus), given that the company is audited by an 
industry specialist auditor  
 
4.3.4  Audit methodology, client operating and strategic initiatives and 
reporting accuracy 
 
Under the business risk methodology, risk assessment typically starts with a 
strategic analysis of the client. This assessment comprises an analysis of the industry 
within which the client is operating, the client’s strategy to achieve a sustainable 
competitive advantage, the business risks that threaten the success of this strategy and the 
client’s responses to these risks. As such, the auditor gains a thorough understanding of 
the adequacy and feasibility of the company’s strategy in light of the external business 
environment and client internal processes and resources (Bell et al., 1997). This is in 
contrast to traditional auditing, where a formal analysis of the client’s strategy and 
whether it can be achieved are not incorporated into the audit process. Under the business 
risk auditing methodology however, assessment of client strategic viability is primordial 
and provides the basis for forming financial statement expectations.  
Bell et al. (1997) state that this strategic analysis is particularly valuable to assess 
the overall business viability of the client, implying that this information is potentially 
very useful for going-concern decision-making. Hence, we formulate the following 
hypothesis, which states that the likelihood of Type II reporting errors is lower when a 
client that implements strategic or operating turnaround initiatives is audited by a business 
risk auditor: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4A:  Strategic and operating management initiatives decrease the likelihood 
of Type II reporting errors (ceteris paribus), given that the company is audited by a 
business risk auditor  
 
Bell et al. (1997) also emphasize that a thorough understanding of the client’s 
business and industry is of vital importance to conduct this analysis. This implies that the 
benefits of this type of analysis can only be realized if the auditor obtains a complete and 
correct insight into the dynamics of the client’s business and industry. Moreover, as noted  
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earlier, research by Ballou et al. (2004) and O’Donnell and Schultz (2005) suggests that 
the assessment of strategic performance may have a negative impact on audit quality 
under certain circumstances.  
Based on this argumentation, we state an alternative hypothesis which predicts that 
the implementation of strategic and operating management initiatives may increase the 
likelihood of Type II reporting errors when the company is audited by a business risk 
auditor:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 4B:  Strategic and operating management initiatives increase the likelihood 
of Type II reporting errors (ceteris paribus), given that the company is audited by a 
business risk auditor  
 
 
4.4  MODEL SPECIFICATION AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
 
In order to investigate the above research questions, we conduct our analyses in 
three stages. In the first stage, we estimate a base model to predict the likelihood of 
reporting errors based on prior research. Subsequently, we assess which test variables with 
respect to industry specialisation and auditor type have incremental explanatory power 
beyond the control variables. In the second stage, we develop a number of regression 
models that test the relationship between industry specialisation, management actions and 
the likelihood of Type II reporting errors. In the third stage, we estimate a series of 
regression models that assess the relationship between audit methodology, management 
actions and the likelihood of Type II reporting errors.  
 
Stage 1: 
1)  ERRORII = f(control variables) 
2)  ERROR II = f(control variables, auditor specialisation) 
3)  ERROR II = f(control variables, audit methodology) 
4)  ERROR II = f(control variables, industry specialisation, audit methodology, 




Stage 2:    
5)   ERROR II = f(control variables, auditor specialisation, management initiatives, 
auditor specialisation*management initiatives) 
 
Stage 3:    
6)   ERROR II= f(control variables, audit methodology, management initiatives, 
audit methodology*management initiatives) 
 
4.4.1 Dependent  variable 
 
The dependent variable represents Type II reporting errors (ERROR II) and equals 
one if the audit opinion prior to bankruptcy was not modified for going-concern reasons, 
and zero otherwise. 
 
4.4.2 Independent  variables 
 
4.4.2.1  Industry specialisation variables 
Prior research has used various measures of industry specialisation. Most of these 
measures are based on audit firm market share within a particular industry (see, for 
example, studies by Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and Stokes, 2002; Krishnan, 2003; 
Casterella et al., 2004; Chen, Moroney and Houghton, 2005).  The underlying reasoning is 
that the firms with the largest market shares have developed the largest knowledge base 
within that particular industry and have made significant investments in developing 
industry-specific audit technologies (Neal and Riley, 2004). We classify auditors as 
industry specialists if they have a within-industry market-share of at least 25 percent. Prior 
to the consolidation of the Big 8 into the Big 6 in 1989, the auditor specialisation literature 
designated auditors as industry specialists if they audited more than 10 percent of firms in 
the industry (see, for example, Palmrose, 1986; Defond, 1992; Craswell et al., 1995). 
After the consolidation, most auditor specialisation studies used a specialisation measure 
of 20 percent market share (see, for example, Neal and Riley, 2004; Dunn and Mayhew, 
2004; Casterella et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2005).  Because the data of this study are drawn 
from the years 1998-2001, with all observations after the 1998 PricewaterhouseCoopers 
merger, a more restrictive specialisation measure seems appropriate.   We set our measure  
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of industry specialisation at a 25 percent market share cut-off, which requires industry 
specialists to service a market share at least 25 percent greater than if the firms were to 
split the industry evenly among them. The variable SPECIALIST is set equal to one if the 
company is audited by a Big 5 auditor with at least 25 percent market share in the 
industry, and zero otherwise. The auditor's industry share (using the square root of client 
sales as the base) in each two-digit SIC code is computed using the population of all 




4.4.2.2  Audit methodology variable 
Lemon, Tatum and Turley (2000) conducted the first major international study of 
the business risk audit methodology. This study involved a survey and detailed interviews 
with partners from Big 5 audit firms and some second tier firms in the UK, US, and 
Canada. The results from this study indicated that substantial differences exist between 
audit firms with respect to the implementation of this audit methodology. Due to 
confidentiality agreements, however, the nature and extent of these variations were not 
explored in this study. This issue received further attention in a more recent study by 
Curtis and Turley (2005), providing more details with respect to the diversity in the 
approaches of the Big 5 firms. The interviews in this study indicated that two of the five 
largest audit firms adopted the business risk methodology to a great extent, while the 
remaining three were somewhat lagging behind. Issues that caused much debate between 
the participating firms were the scope of business risks to be addressed, how such risks 
should be linked to the financial statements, the appropriateness of relying on high level 
controls and the concept and implications of ‘significant risks’. In this study, we proxy for 
the differences between Big 5 audit firms with regard to the adoption of the business risk 
methodology by including a dummy variable BRA, which is coded 1 if the company is 
audited by one of the two Big 5 firms that implemented the business risk audit 
methodology to a great extent, and 0 otherwise.  
 
                                                 
10 All but two industries included in this study comprise more than 30 companies.  Excluding the three 
observations from these two industries (which comprise 29 and 24 companies) does not change our results.  
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4.4.2.3  Strategic and operating variables 
We measure company turnaround approach using variables that contain 
information regarding turnaround strategies that have been implemented during the year 
under audit to overcome financial difficulties. Consistent with the categorization of 
management turnaround initiatives in chapter 2, we investigate the impact of three 
categories of management initiatives that may potentially mitigate the adverse conditions 
affecting performance. First, we distinguish between strategic and operating turnaround 
initiatives. This categorization stems from the strategic literature, where the distinction 
between a strategic and operating turnaround approach was first introduced by Hofer 
(1980). Operating initiatives aim at a short-term improvement in financial performance 
through for example cost-cutting, asset disposal, increased marketing efforts and 
upgrading existing products and processes, whereas strategic initiatives aim at long-term 
profitability by solving external, strategic problems through for example cooperative 
agreements, acquisitions or the introduction of new products.  
Based on prior research with respect to the performance implications of company 
strategy (see, for example, Stuart, 2000; King, Dalton, Daily and Covin, 2004; Mishina, 
Pollock and Porac, 2004), we further categorize the strategic turnaround initiatives into 
initiatives that are expected to have a positive impact on the company’s liquidity status 
within the next 12 months and strategic approaches that are only expected to have a long-
term impact on performance. We classify cooperative agreements with other firms as a 
strategy expected to have a positive short-term impact on performance, while the 
introduction of new products and acquisitions of other companies are considered strategies 
with a long-term impact on performance. 
Based on this categorization of company turnaround initiatives, we define the 
variable OPERATING as a discrete variable reflecting the number of operating initiatives 
implemented by the company during the year under audit. The variable STRATEGIC is 
introduced to capture the aggregate impact of all strategic management actions. We 
categorize these strategic actions further into STRATST and STRATLT, which reflect the 
number of strategic initiatives that are expected to have a short-term and long-term impact 
on corporate performance.  
The information regarding client operating and strategic initiatives was manually 
collected from the relevant 10-Ks filed with the SEC, by reading these documents cover to 
cover and completing a strategic scorecard. With respect to operating initiatives  
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(OPERATING), we assessed whether the company engaged in: (1) cost-cutting activities, 
(2) asset disposal, (3) upgrading existing products and processes and (4) increasing 
marketing efforts. This provided a discrete measure for each company with values from 0 
to 4, reflecting the number of operating initiatives undertaken by the client during the year 
under audit. This score was subsequently divided by the maximum score in the sample to 
obtain a measure with a range from 0 to 1. With respect to strategic initiatives 
(STRATEGIC), we assessed whether the company: (1) introduced new products, (2) 
acquired other companies, and (3) entered into cooperative agreements with other firms. 
This resulted in a discrete measure with values from 0 to 3, which was subsequently 
divided by its maximum score in the sample. We define STRATST as a variable that 
captures a company’s engagement in strategic initiatives that are capable of generating a 
short-term impact on performance. This variable was coded 1 if the company engaged in 
cooperative agreements with other firms during the year under audit, and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, in order to construct a measure for strategic initiatives that are likely to have only 
a long-term impact on performance (STRATLT), we assessed whether the company (1) 
acquired other companies and (2) introduced new products during the year under audit. 
This provided a discrete measure with values from 0 to 2, which was subsequently divided 
by the maximum score in the sample.  
Another category of management initiatives to mitigate adverse conditions consists 
of money-raising activities identified in prior audit opinion research (Behn, Kaplan and 
Krumwiede, 2001; Geiger and Rama, 2003). We construct a measure RAISEMONEY, by 
assessing whether (1) the auditee plans to borrow funds through existing bank lines of 
credit or other approved debt instruments, and (2) the auditee plans to issue equity through 
existing or committed arrangements. The coding of these money-raising activities 
provides a discrete measure with values from 0 to 2, which was subsequently divided by 
the maximum score in the sample. The information regarding client initiatives to raise 
money was manually collected from the relevant 10-Ks filed with the SEC. 
 
4.4.2.4  Control variables  
Based on prior research (McKeown et al., 1991; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; 
Carcello et al., 1995; Geiger and Raghunandan 2001; Gaeremynck and Willekens, 2003; 
Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2004), we include a number of control variables capturing the 
financial condition of the firm, bankruptcy lag, and firm size. Consistent with prior  
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research, we measure client size using log of net sales (LNSALES). We also use the 
financial distress indicator developed by Zmijewski (1984) to calculate the probability of 
bankruptcy (ZMIJEWSKI). In addition, we classify a company as being in default 
(DEFAULT) if there is either payment default or technical default of loan covenants. 
Finally, we include a company’s bankruptcy lag (SQBANKRUPTLAG), reflecting the 
square root of days from the date of the audit report to the bankruptcy date. LNSALES 
and the necessary data to calculate the financial distress indicator ZMIJEWSKI were 
collected from the WORLDSCOPE database. SQBANKRUPTLAG and DEFAULT were 
calculated with information from the WORLDSCOPE database and the company’s 10-K. 
The definition of the test and control variables is given in table 4.1. 
 
TABLE 4.1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND EXPECTED SIGNS 
Variable  Definition  Expected 
sign 
    
Dependent variable    
    ERROR   1 if no going-concern report was issued for a company that went 
bankrupt the subsequent year; 0 otherwise 
 
    
Independent variables    
  Audit Methodology     
     BRA  1 if the company is audited by a Big 5 auditor who adopted the 
business risk methodology, 0 otherwise 
+/- 
    
  Auditor Specialisation     
SPECIALIST  1 if the company is audited by a Big  5 auditor who holds more 
than 25% market share (measured in square root of client net sales) 
in a two-digit industry, 0 otherwise 
- 
    
  Management initiatives    
OPERATING  A score from 0 to 4, scaled by its maximum value in the sample,  
representing the sum of all operating initiatives (marketing, asset 
disposal, upgrading of products and processes, cost-cutting) 
? 
    
STRATEGIC  A score from 0 to 3, scaled by its maximum value in the sample, 
representing the sum of all strategic initiatives (new products, 
acquisitions, cooperative agreements) 
? 
STRATST  Dummy variable which equals one if the company undertakes 
strategic initiatives with a short-term impact (cooperative 
agreements)  
? 
STRATLT  A score from 0 to 2, scaled by its maximum value in the sample, 
representing the sum of all strategic initiatives with a long-term 
impact (new products, acquisitions)  
? 
    
Money-raising activities    
    RAISEMONEY  A score from 0 to 2, scaled by its maximum value in the sample, 
representing the sum of financial initiatives to raise money through 
the issuance of stock or additional borrowings  
? 
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TABLE 4.1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND EXPECTED SIGNS 
Variable  Definition  Expected 
sign 
    
  Control variables    
ZMIJEWSKI  probability of bankruptcy, calculated from the Zmijewski (1984) 
weighted probit bankruptcy prediction model 
- 





the square root of the number of days from the audit report date to 
the date of bankruptcy 
+ 
LNSALES    natural log of net sales  ? 
    
 
 
4.5 SAMPLE  SELECTION 
 
Because the purpose of this study is to shed some light on the causes of Type II 
errors, we run our analysis on a sample of bankrupt companies. We obtained a list of US 
public company bankruptcies for the years 1999 through 2002 by searching the Wall street 
Journal Index and several other web-based resources
11 under the heading “chapter 11” for 
those years. We subsequently restricted our sample to companies in the manufacturing 
industries (SIC 20 to 39) to eliminate confounding industry effects. This resulted in a 
sample of 127 manufacturing companies that went bankrupt in the 1999-2002 period. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., McKeown et al. 1991; Mutchler et al. 1997; Geiger 
and Raghunandan 2001), for firms that had already filed for bankruptcy at the time the 
audit opinion was issued we use the prior year's data provided the bankruptcy occurred 
within a year of the prior year's audit opinion date.  
Because companies sometimes enter into bankruptcy proceedings as a strategic 
reaction to sudden adverse events, Hopwood, McKeown and Mutchler (1994) argue that 
investigations of auditors’ going-concern opinion decisions should be conducted on 
samples that have been partitioned into stressed and non-stressed categories. Hence, we 
restrict the analysis to financially stressed companies in the same manner as our 
subsample of non-going-concern companies in chapter 2.  
Applying these restrictions to the sample of bankrupt companies resulted in a 
sample of 102 companies for which the following conditions are satisfied: (a) the 
companies went bankrupt in the years 1999 to 2002, (b) the companies had SIC codes in 
                                                 
11 www.defaultrisk.com, www.BankruptcyData.com  
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the range 20-39, (c) the companies had audit opinions less than 12 months prior to the 
bankruptcy date, and (d) the companies exhibited at least two financial distress criteria. 
More specifically, we retained 14 bankrupt companies in 1998, 16 bankrupt companies in 
1999, 45 bankrupt companies in 2000 and 27 bankrupt companies in 2001. One 
observation was identified as an outlier and removed from the sample. This yielded a final 
sample of 101 firm observations. The number of observations per industry is given in table 
4.2. 
 
             TABLE 4.2: SAMPLE OF BANKRUPT COMPANIES PER TWO DIGIT INDUSTRY GROUPING 
Two-digit 
SIC Code 
Industry name  Number of 
Companies 
20  Food and Kindred Products  5 
22  Textile Mill Products  7 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  4 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  1 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  1 
26  Paper and Allied Products  4 
27  Printing and Publishing  2 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  11 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products  2 
31  Leather and Leather Products  1 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  5 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  6 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  2 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  14 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  14 
37 Transportation  Equipment  11 
38  Instruments and Related Products  7 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  4 





4.6.1 Descriptive  statistics  and univariate results  
 
Table 4.3 contains the descriptive statistics for the full sample of bankrupt 
companies, whereas table 4.4 compares the descriptive statistics of the companies with 
reporting misclassifications and those without reporting misclassifications. Inspection of 
table 4.3 reveals that that 26 percent of the sample companies are audited by a business 
risk auditor and 31 percent of the companies are audited by a specialist auditor. With 
respect to the implemented management initiatives, we note that more than half of the 
sample firms resort to an operating strategy (OPERATING, median = 0.50) or a long-term  
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expansionary strategy (STRATLT, median = 0.50), while a cooperative strategy is much 
less implemented (STRATST, median = 0.00).  
 
TABLE 4.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Variables  Mean  Median  St. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent variable      
    ERROR II  0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
       
Independent variables       
  Audit Methodology       
    BRA  0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 
       
  Auditor Specialisation       
    SPECIALIST  0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
       
  Operating approach       
OPERATING   0.51 0.50 0.24 0.00 1.00 
       
  Strategic approach       
STRATEGIC  0.38 0.33 0.29 0.00 1.00 
STRATST  0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
    STRATLT  0.39 0.50 0.35 0.00 1.00 
       
 Money-raising activities       
RAISEMONEY  0.26 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
       
  Control variables       
ZMIJEWSKI  -0.51 -1.28 3.25 -5.29 14.87 
DEFAULT  0.55 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
SQBANKRUPTLAG  13.95 15.00  3.85  4.36  19.08 
LNSALES   11.74 12.14  2.56  0.00  15.61 
       
 
 
Table 4.4 reports the results of a t-test of differences between firms with audit 
reporting errors and firms without audit reporting errors. The results show that companies 
with a Type II reporting error are generally larger (LNSALES, t-statistic = 2.91), are less 
likely to be in default (DEFAULT, t-statistic = 3.82), experience less financial distress 
(ZMIJEWSKI, t-statistic = 4.05), have a longer bankruptcy lag (BANKRUPTLAG, t-
statistic = 4.80), and are more likely to disclose plans to raise money through additional 
borrowings or the issuance of stock (RAISEMONEY, t-statistic = 4.87). The variables 
representing strategic initiatives and auditor type do not differ significantly between both 




TABLE  4.4:  UNIVARIATE TESTS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REPORTING ERROR FIRMS AND NON-
REPORTING ERROR FIRMS 
  Non-reporting error firms 
(n=56) 





    Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  (t-statistic) 
        
  Audit Methodology        
 BRA  0.25 0.44 0.27 0.45  0.19 
        
   Auditor Specialisation        
 SPECIALIST  0.27 0.45 0.36 0.48  0.94 
        
Operating approach        
OPERATING   0.52 0.24 0.49 0.25  0.48 
        
  Strategic approach        
     STRATEGIC  0.36 0.27 0.41 0.31  0.87 
     STRATST  0.30 0.46 0.42 0.50  1.23 
     STRATLT  0.38 0.32 0.40 0.39  0.23 
        
 Money-raising activities        
     RAISEMONEY  0.14 0.26 0.41 0.29  4.87*** 
        
  Control variables        
ZMIJEWSKI  0.52 3.73 -1.79 1.87  4.05*** 
DEFAULT  0.71 0.46 0.36 0.48  3.82*** 
SQBANKRUPTLAG  12.51 4.07 15.74 2.67  4.80*** 
LNSALES   11.13 2.85 12.51 1.92  2.91*** 
        
*      indicates significance at the .10 level (two-tailed) 
**    indicates significance at the .05 level (two-tailed) 
***  indicates significance at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
 
Tables 4.5a, 4.5b, 4.5c, and 4.5d summarize the Big 5 industry market shares for 
all 18 manufacturing industries in the study. Consistent with the Big 5 industry 
specialisation measures used in a study by Francis et al. (2005), PricewaterhouseCoopers 
is the industry leader in more than half of the manufacturing industries. Averaged across al 
years, PricewaterhouseCoopers is the national leader in 11 industries, Ernst & Young, 
Deloitte & Touche and Arthur Andersen are national leaders in 2 industries, and KPMG is 







TABLE 4.5A: BIG 5 AUDITOR MARKET SHARES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES FOR 1998  
    Industry Market Shares 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  AA  EY  DT  KPMG  PW 
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.12 0.15  0.13  0.20 0.34 
22  Textile Mill Products  0.16 0.36  0.17  0.12 0.10 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  0.20 0.25  0.21  0.03 0.16 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  0.34 0.05  0.11  0.08 0.36 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  0.24 0.09  0.08  0.13 0.36 
26  Paper and Allied Products  0.22 0.14  0.15  0.13 0.28 
27  Printing and Publishing  0.12 0.19  0.21  0.18 0.24 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  0.13 0.13  0.17  0.15 0.32 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products 0.20  0.22  0.10  0.09  0.33 
31  Leather and Leather Products  0.00 0.30  0.13  0.21 0.21 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  0.26 0.22  0.15  0.10 0.21 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  0.13 0.24  0.13  0.03 0.41 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  0.19 0.22  0.07  0.13 0.34 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  0.15 0.19  0.11  0.13 0.33 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  0.12 0.21  0.13  0.25 0.22 
37 Transportation  Equipment  0.11 0.18  0.23  0.12 0.31 
38  Instruments and Related Products  0.15 0.22  0.12  0.11 0.32 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  0.12 0.15  0.27  0.13 0.21 
          




TABLE 4.5B: BIG 5 AUDITOR MARKET SHARES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES FOR 1999  
    Industry Market Shares 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  AA  EY  DT  KPMG  PWC 
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.12 0.14  0.14  0.19 0.35 
22  Textile Mill Products  0.15 0.37  0.16  0.13 0.11 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  0.19 0.22  0.28  0.04 0.14 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  0.33 0.10  0.13  0.09 0.31 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  0.25 0.10  0.09  0.14 0.32 
26  Paper and Allied Products  0.22 0.16  0.14  0.12 0.28 
27  Printing and Publishing  0.13 0.22  0.16  0.20 0.23 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  0.14 0.13  0.17  0.15 0.32 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products  0.21 0.22  0.08  0.08 0.34 
31  Leather and Leather Products  0.06 0.28  0.12  0.19 0.20 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  0.26 0.20  0.22  0.07 0.18 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  0.12 0.27  0.15  0.05 0.38 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  0.19 0.21  0.08  0.11 0.34 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  0.15 0.18  0.12  0.16 0.33 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  0.11 0.19  0.13  0.26 0.25 
37 Transportation  Equipment  0.11 0.21  0.23  0.11 0.31 
38  Instruments and Related Products  0.16 0.22  0.10  0.10 0.33 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  0.11 0.15  0.26  0.13 0.19 
          






TABLE 4.5C: BIG 5 AUDITOR MARKET SHARES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES FOR 2000  
    Industry Market Shares 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  AA  EY  DT  KPMG  PWC 
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.12 0.14  0.10  0.22 0.37 
22  Textile Mill Products  0.13 0.40  0.16  0.15 0.07 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  0.19 0.25  0.25  0.04 0.14 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  0.35 0.11  0.12  0.10 0.29 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  0.26 0.08  0.09  0.11 0.33 
26  Paper and Allied Products  0.14 0.20  0.16  0.16 0.29 
27  Printing and Publishing  0.15 0.20  0.16  0.21 0.23 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  0.14 0.16  0.17  0.19 0.27 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products 0.18  0.21  0.11  0.13  0.30 
31  Leather and Leather Products  0.06 0.27  0.13  0.19 0.21 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  0.27 0.22  0.25  0.10 0.09 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  0.12 0.24  0.13  0.03 0.45 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  0.17 0.19  0.07  0.13 0.36 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  0.15 0.23  0.12  0.15 0.29 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  0.10 0.19  0.12  0.26 0.26 
37 Transportation  Equipment  0.13 0.20  0.25  0.11 0.29 
38  Instruments and Related Products  0.14 0.24  0.09  0.11 0.35 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  0.13 0.11  0.24  0.10 0.20 
          




TABLE 4.5D: BIG 5 AUDITOR MARKET SHARES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES FOR 2001  
    Industry Market Shares 
Two-Digit SIC  Industry  AA  EY  DT  KPMG  PWC 
20  Food and Kindred Products  0.10 0.17  0.11  0.23 0.34 
22  Textile Mill Products  0.10 0.44  0.09  0.18 0.08 
23  Apparel and Other Textile Products  0.18 0.23  0.24  0.04 0.19 
24  Lumber and Wood Products  0.32 0.13  0.12  0.07 0.32 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  0.22 0.12  0.08  0.12 0.34 
26  Paper and Allied Products  0.16 0.21  0.12  0.15 0.32 
27  Printing and Publishing  0.14 0.22  0.14  0.21 0.23 
28  Chemicals and Allied Products  0.14 0.14  0.16  0.16 0.32 
30  Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products  0.18 0.22  0.16  0.11 0.26 
31  Leather and Leather Products  0.06 0.29  0.13  0.20 0.19 
32  Stone, Clay and Glass Products  0.25 0.23  0.22  0.10 0.13 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  0.12 0.21  0.15  0.03 0.44 
34  Fabricated Metal Products  0.17 0.22  0.08  0.11 0.36 
35  Industrial Machinery and Equipment  0.14 0.27  0.11  0.14 0.29 
36  Electronic and Other Equipment  0.11 0.20  0.11  0.25 0.25 
37 Transportation  Equipment  0.09 0.21  0.24  0.11 0.31 
38  Instruments and Related Products  0.13 0.24  0.11  0.10 0.35 
39 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing  0.17 0.12  0.22  0.13 0.19 
          
AA: Arthur Andersen; EY: Ernst & Young; DL: Deloitte & Touche; KPMG: Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler and PWC: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  
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4.6.2 Multivariate  analysis 
 
The results of the multivariate logistic analysis of Type II reporting errors are 
presented in tables 4.6 and 4.7. In table 4.6, we present the results of four regression 
models that provide a test of hypotheses 1 and 2 by including test variables relating to 
industry specialisation and audit methodology. The models in table 4.7 include a set of 
variables representing strategic and operating management initiatives and explore 
interaction effects between these variables, industry specialisation and the business risk 
methodology. As such, they provide a test of hypotheses 3 and 4.  
            In table 4.6, model 1 is estimated to provide a base model for Type II reporting 
errors. The model has good explanatory power with a chi-square statistic of 56.38, a 
pseudo R
2 of 0.53 and a McFadden R
2 of 0.41. Consistent with prior research, the results 
indicate that a Type II reporting error is less likely to occur when the company is smaller 
(LNSALES, p = 0.0131), has a higher probability of bankruptcy, (ZMIJEWSKI, p = 
0.0017), is in default (DEFAULT, p = 0.0009), and has a shorter bankruptcy lag 
(SQBANKRUPTLAG, p = 0.0006).  
In order to investigate our first two hypotheses, models 2, 3 and 4 in table 4.6 add 
our test variables with respect to auditor specialisation and audit methodology to the base 
model. The pseudo R
2 of these models varies between 0.53 and 0.54 and the McFadden R
2 
varies between 0.41 and 0.43, which is comparable to the base model. The estimation 
results of model 2 suggest that industry expertise (SPECIALIST, p = 0.8667) is not 
significantly associated with the likelihood of type II reporting errors. These findings are 
not supportive of our first hypothesis, which states that that the likelihood of type II 
reporting errors is lower for industry specialist auditors.  In addition, the estimation results 
from the third regression model show no significant association between audit reporting 
accuracy and the business risk methodology (BRA, p = 0.1379), which contradicts 
hypotheses 2a and 2b.  In model 4, we explore interaction effects between the business 
risk methodology and industry specialisation. Interestingly, the estimation results of this 
model suggest that the likelihood of reporting errors is higher for business risk auditors 
that are not industry specialists (BRA, p = 0.0752). As such, we find some support for 
hypothesis 2a, which predicts that the likelihood of audit failure increases when a 
company is audited by a business risk auditor.  This finding is also consistent with 
previous research by Ballou et al. (2004) and O’Donnell and Schultz (2005) indicating that  
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under certain circumstances the business risk audit methodology might have a negative 
impact on audit reporting quality 
 
The regression models in table 4.7 investigate hypotheses 3 and 4 by testing 
interaction effects between management initiatives and industry specialisation, as well as 
interaction effects between management initiatives and the business risk methodology. 
Models 5a and 5b include interaction effects between industry specialisation and client 
turnaround initiatives, yielding a pseudo R
2 of 0.60 and a McFadden R
2 of 0.53 for model 
5a and a pseudo R
2 of 0.61 and a McFadden R
2 of 0.57 for model 5b. The estimation 
results of these models indicate that the likelihood of Type II reporting errors is higher for 
clients resorting to operating initiatives to resolve their financial difficulties 
(OPERATING, p < 0.0388), as well as for clients that implement initiatives to raise 
money (RAISEMONEY, p < 0.0049) or strategic initiatives that are expected to generate 
cash inflows in the short run (STRATST, p = 0.0621). This suggests that these turnaround 
initiatives might be potentially misleading with respect to a client’s ability to remain in 
business for the next twelve months, as they increase the likelihood that a clean opinion is 
issued for a soon-to be bankrupt company. The estimation results from models 5a and 5b 
further indicate that the negative impact of operating turnaround initiatives on the 
likelihood of type II reporting errors is mitigated when the auditor is an industry specialist 
(OPERATING*SPECIALIST, p < 0.0875) This is consistent with hypothesis 3 and 
suggests that industry specialist auditors might be better able to judge the adequacy of 
client operating initiatives to induce recovery than non-specialist auditors.  However, this 
positive effect only holds for operating turnaround initiatives as we find no evidence of a 
positive effect of a specialist auditors’ consideration of strategic initiatives on reporting 
accuracy (STRATEGIC*SPECIALIST, p = 0.6310, STRATST*SPECIALIST, p = 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In table 4.7, we also present the results of our test of hypothesis 4. Models 6a and 
6b test the significance of interaction effects between audit methodology and client 
turnaround initiatives. These models yield pseudo R
2’s of 0.60 and 0.61 and McFadden 
R
2’s of 0.55 and 0.57 and show no evidence of a significant relationship between client 
strategic and operating turnaround initiatives and the likelihood of type II errors 
(OPERATING, p < 0.9381, STRATEGIC, p = 0.7233, STRATST, p = 0.8270, STRATLT 
p = 0.5779), although the presence of initiatives to raise money remains significantly 
positively associated with the likelihood of type II reporting errors (RAISEMONEY, p 
<0.0028).  Furthermore, the estimation results from model 6a with respect to a business 
risk auditor’s evaluation of operating and strategic management initiatives indicates that 
the likelihood of type II reporting errors is higher for clients that implement operating 
initiatives and are audited by a business risk auditor (OPERATING*BRA, p = 0.0573), 
whereas a business risk auditor’s evaluation of strategic initiatives has no impact on 
reporting accuracy (STRATEGIC*BRA, p = 0.9350, STRATST*BRA, p = 0.6184, 
STRATLT*BRA, p = 0.3659). This result is supportive of hypothesis 4b, which states that 
the presence of strategic and operating turnaround initiatives increases the likelihood of 
Type II reporting errors if the company is audited by a business risk auditor. This suggests 
that an analysis of client strategic viability as incorporated in the business risk audit 
methodology may not always be beneficial to audit quality. In other words, client strategic 
analysis may only contribute to audit quality if auditors have sufficient industry 
experience to judge the adequacy of client strategic and operating initiatives.  
  
4.6.3  Sensitivity tests   
 
To test the robustness of our results, we have performed several sensitivity 
analyses. Prior industry specialization studies (e.g. Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson and 
Stokes, 2002; Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003; Chen et al., 2005) have estimated auditor 
market share using various measures of client size (e.g., total assets, net sales, audit fees). 
To ensure that our results do not depend on the chosen size measure, we replicated our 
analysis using total assets as a base for market share. This analysis (not tabulated) yields 
qualitatively similar results. More specifically, replication of table 4.6 shows that the 
coefficient of BRA (p = 0.0904) remains significantly positive in model 4, while the other 
variables with respect to audit methodology and industry specialization remain statistically  
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insignificant. Replication of the analysis in table 4.7 also yields qualitatively similar 
results.  
As a second sensitivity test, we estimate market share using the number of clients 
as the base (see, for example, Craswell et al., 1995; Balsam et al., 2003; Mayhew and 
Wilkins, 2003). By using this measure, we control for situations where an auditor has a 
number of small clients in an industry and as such has developed industry specialist 
knowledge (Balsam et al., 2003). When we use this specialization measure, we cannot 
include the variable SPECIALIST*BRA in model 4 because there are no business risk 
auditors in the sample that audit more than 25 percent of the companies in a given 
industry.  Besides this, the estimation results from table 4.6 (not tabulated) remain 
unchanged, showing a significantly positive coefficient of BRA (p = 0.0999) in model 4. 
Re-estimation of the results in table 4.7 (not tabulated) yields no significant results for our 
test variables, although RAISEMONEY remains significant (p < 0.0038) in all models. 
One potential explanation for this finding is that an unweighted market share measure 
based on the number of clients audited may not fully capture the impact that large clients 
have on auditors’ development of industry specialty knowledge.  
As a third sensitivity test, we use different cutoff levels (20 and 30 percent) to test 
the robustness of our results to alternative SPECIALIST cutoffs. Following Ferguson and 
Stokes (2002), Ferguson et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2005), we also test an alternative 
industry specialization variable, LEADER, which is coded 1 if the company is audited by 
the largest supplier in the industry. The analysis (not tabulated) for the 20 percent cutoff 
yields similar results, except that STRATST is no longer significant (p = 0.1492).  
When we apply the specialization cutoff of 30 percent (not tabulated), we can no 
longer estimate the variable SPECIALIST*BRA because we have no companies in the 
sample that are audited by a business risk auditor who supplies at least 30 percent of the 
industry. The estimation results of model 4 furthermore indicate that the rate of audit 
reporting errors is not only higher for non-specialist auditors that apply the business risk 
methodology (BRA, p = 0.0550), but also for specialist auditors that are not business risk 
auditors (SPECIALIST, p = 0.0598). Re-estimation of the results in table 2.7 yields no 
significant results for our test variables, except for RAISEMONEY, which is significant in 
all models (p < 0.0045).   
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Re-estimation of the models with the LEADER specialization measure (not 
tabulated) does not change our results, the only exception being that SPECIALIST now 





In this chapter, we examine the effect of audit methodology and auditor industry 
specialization on the likelihood of type II reporting errors. In addition, we investigate 
whether industry expertise or the implementation of the business risk methodology 
increases auditors’ ability to judge the adequacy of management turnaround initiatives to 
mitigate financial distress.  
With respect to the relationship between reporting accuracy, auditor specialization 
and audit methodology, we hypothesized a lower likelihood of audit reporting errors for 
industry specialist auditors and formulated two competing hypotheses with respect to the 
relationship between the implementation of the business risk audit methodology and the 
likelihood of Type II reporting errors. Finally, we argued that the effect of client operating 
and strategic initiatives on the likelihood of Type II reporting errors is dependent on 
whether those clients are audited by a business risk auditor or an industry specialist 
auditor. 
 
In order to test the hypothesized relationships between reporting accuracy, industry 
specialization and audit methodology, we developed a sequence of logistic regression 
models. In the first phase of the analysis, we investigated the significance of test variables 
relating to industry specialization and audit methodology. The results of this analysis 
provide no evidence of a lower likelihood of audit reporting errors for industry specialist 
auditors or business risk auditors.  However, we do find evidence of non-specialist 
business risk auditors increasing the likelihood of Type II reporting errors. In other words, 
our findings suggest that the implementation of the business risk methodology for non-
specialist auditors might have a negative impact on audit reporting accuracy. 
In the second phase of the analysis, we tested the relationship between reporting 
accuracy, industry specialization and client strategic and operating initiatives. The analysis 
indicates that the likelihood of Type II reporting errors is higher when a client implements  
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operating turnaround actions, initiatives to raise money or strategic actions that are likely 
to generate short-term cash inflows. The implementation of these strategies decreases the 
likelihood that a going-concern report is issued for a soon-to-be bankrupt company and as 
such has a negative impact on audit reporting accuracy. The results from this analysis 
furthermore suggest that the negative effect of operating initiatives on audit reporting 
accuracy is reversed when the auditor is an industry specialist. This finding underlines the 
importance of industry knowledge when judging the adequacy of client operating 
turnaround initiatives.  
In the third and final phase of the analysis, we tested interaction effects between 
management initiatives and the implementation of the business risk methodology. 
Interestingly, the results indicate that the likelihood of reporting errors is higher for a 
client that implements operating initiatives and is audited by a business risk auditor, 
whereas a business risk auditors’ evaluation of strategic initiatives has no significant 
impact on audit reporting accuracy. Together with the results from the analysis in phase 
two, this suggests that an analysis of client strategic viability may not be beneficial to 
audit quality, unless auditors have adequate industry experience to judge the adequacy of 
operating and strategic initiatives.  
 
This study has important implications for audit practitioners and audit clients. In 
particular, the results with respect to auditors’ evaluation of operating initiatives suggest 
that the likelihood of Type II reporting errors is lower when an industry specialist auditor 
is included in an audit team evaluating a distressed company that implements operating 
turnaround initiatives.  This result also suggests that audit clients who are implementing 
operating turnaround initiatives might significantly reduce type II reporting errors by 
hiring an auditor who has sufficient industry experience. In addition, our findings indicate 
that auditors implementing the business risk methodology might gain from obtaining a 
complete overview of the specificities of their client’s industry when conducting a 
strategic viability analysis.  
 
We conclude with a discussion of limitations and possible avenues for future 
research. As in the second chapter of this dissertation, the sample size of this study is kept 
rather small and we investigate only the disclosure of management plans and actions in the 
annual report and 10-K as a proxy of implemented turnaround initiatives. A second  
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limitation relates to the use of a dummy variable as a proxy for the audit methodology 
implemented by the auditor. Future research might refine this measure by using various 
criteria to assess the degree to which the business risk methodology is implemented. 
Third, we have examined only type II reporting errors, although the investigation of the 
association between type I misclassifications, management initiatives, auditor 
specialisation and audit methodology might also yield important insights. Other interesting 
avenues for future research include the investigation of the relationship between the 
implementation of the business risk methodology and other measures of audit quality, 
such as auditor litigation, earnings management etc.  Moreover, future research might 
examine the impact of business risk auditing on other types of audit decisions, such as 






























































This dissertation examined the auditor’s consideration of strategic management 
plans in a going-concern decision context. In particular, we have focused on the following 
topics:  (1) the impact of management initiatives to mitigate financial distress on the 
going-concern decision and (2) the impact of industry specialisation, audit methodology 
and management initiatives on going-concern reporting accuracy.  
Chapter 1 introduced the research issues that are addressed in this dissertation and 
positioned these within the going-concern decision framework. In chapter 2, we 
investigated the association between the implementation of strategic and operating 
turnaround initiatives and the auditor’s decision to issue a going-concern modified audit 
report. Chapter 3 probed deeper into the going-concern decision-making process by 
reporting the results of an experimental study examining the effect of client strategic 
information on the processing of subsequent going-concern information. Finally, chapter 4 
studied the effect of various auditor traits such as industry specialisation and auditing 
methodology on going-concern reporting accuracy and investigated the comparative 
advantage of industry specialists and business risk auditors in evaluating their client’s 
turnaround initiatives. 
This final chapter provides a general discussion of the three previous chapters and 
is organized as follows. Section 5.1 summarizes the three empirical studies. Section 5.2 
discusses the limitations and possible avenues for future research. We conclude in section 





In this dissertation we provide an insight into auditors’ consideration of 
management turnaround initiatives in a going-concern decision context. Prior research that 
examined the determinants of the going-concern decision primarily focused on the  
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identification of financial indicators. In the second chapter of this dissertation, we 
contributed to this literature by empirically testing the predictive value of a comprehensive 
vector of management turnaround initiatives.  
In order to investigate this issue, we used a unique dataset of management 
turnaround initiatives implemented by distressed US companies. Linking this manually 
collected dataset to companies’ audit reports enabled us to gain an insight into the 
auditor’s consideration of management initiatives in a distressed client context. Consistent 
with the strategic literature, we categorized management turnaround initiatives into 
operating initiatives (i.e. cost reduction, asset disposal, increased marketing and product 
upgrading), and strategic initiatives (i.e. product innovation, expansion and cooperative 
strategies). Given that the going-concern decision is an assessment of the likelihood of 
client survival within the next twelve months, we further distinguished between strategic 
growth initiatives that are likely to generate positive cash flows in the short run (i.e. 
cooperative agreements) versus long run (i.e. innovation and expansion strategies).  
The results of this chapter show that operating turnaround initiatives such as cost 
reduction and marketing strategies are positively associated with the likelihood that a 
going-concern opinion is received. This finding suggests that these strategies may be 
perceived by auditors as inadequate or insufficient to induce recovery. A similar result is 
obtained for strategic initiatives that are likely to only generate positive cash flow effects 
in the long run. In particular, our evidence suggests that product innovation initiatives are 
not perceived as mitigating factors but rather as going-concern risk factors. In contrast, we 
find that strategic turnaround initiatives that are likely to generate positive cash flow 
effects in the short run (such as cooperative initiatives) are perceived as a mitigating 
going-concern factor, decreasing the likelihood that a going-concern opinion is received. 
 
In the third chapter, we experimentally investigated the impact of operating 
initiatives and strategic initiatives with a short-term impact on the going-concern decision-
making process. In particular, we investigated whether strategic performance directly 
affects the going-concern judgment or whether it has an indirect effect by changing the 
interpretative framework for subsequent financial going-concern information. Our 
investigation of the potential indirect effect of management turnaround initiatives on 
going-concern judgment is motivated by prior business risk audit research suggesting that 
the holistic perspective that auditors acquire when evaluating a client’s strategic viability  
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substantially impacts the auditor’s evaluation of subsequent audit evidence. In accordance 
with prior going-concern literature, we measured participants’ attention to going-concern 
evidence items by collecting cues recalled.  
In addition to testing the direct and indirect effect of management turnaround 
initiatives on auditors’ going-concern decision, chapter 3 also focused on the differential 
effect of this type of information on going-concern decision-making for experienced and 
novice auditors. Based on prior audit research regarding experience effects, we predicted 
that operating and strategic turnaround initiatives have a greater impact on the going-
concern decision for experienced auditors.  
    Consistent with the results from the previous study, the results of the experiment 
indicate that strategic management initiatives that are likely to generate short-term cash 
inflows have an overall positive impact on the auditor’s going-concern judgment. Further 
analysis of the direct and indirect effect of management turnaround initiatives revealed a 
positive direct effect of strategic initiatives with a short-term impact on going-concern 
judgment for all participants and a negative indirect effect of both strategic and operating 
initiatives for the group of experienced auditors. With respect to the latter effect, the 
results showed that auditors, who were informed that the client attempted to restore 
profitability through the implementation of operating or strategic management initiatives, 
focused more on negative financial going-concern evidence and less on positive financial 
going-concern evidence. This effect might be explained by the fact that experienced 
auditors perceived the implementation of management turnaround initiatives as an “early 
warning signal” that the client might be in financial distress, which subsequently caused 
auditors to focus more on financial distress indicators. 
 
In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, we investigate which auditor 
characteristics are likely to decrease the likelihood of audit reporting errors. In particular, 
we contributed to the literature on audit reporting errors by investigating the impact of 
industry expertise and the implementation of the business risk methodology on the 
likelihood of Type II reporting errors (i.e. issuing a clean opinion for a client that 
subsequently goes bankrupt). Moreover, we investigated whether these traits enable 
auditors to better judge the adequacy of their clients’ operating and strategic turnaround 
initiatives.  
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We investigated these research issues by testing a series of logistic regression 
models. The results of these regression models suggest that the implementation of the 
business risk methodology increases the likelihood of Type II errors. Further analysis 
indicated that this might be attributed to the fact that business risk auditors are less likely 
to issue a going-concern opinion for a client that subsequently goes bankrupt if this client 
implements operating turnaround initiatives.  Contrary to these results, we find that the 
likelihood of Type II errors is lower when a client resorting to an operating turnaround 
approach is audited by an industry specialist auditor. This suggests that an analysis of 
client strategy per se may not reduce the rate of Type II errors, unless the auditor has 
adequate industry experience to judge the adequacy or feasibility of client turnaround 
initiatives.  
 
    Overall, the findings of this dissertation indicate that management turnaround 
initiatives are likely to have a significant impact on going-concern decision-making. In 
particular, the results from chapter 2 show that operating initiatives and strategic 
initiatives which are likely to only generate positive cash flows in the long run 
significantly increase the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion, whereas 
strategic initiatives that are likely to generate cash inflows in the short run significantly 
decrease the likelihood of receiving a going-concern opinion.  Furthermore, the 
experimental research in chapter 3 indicates that the negative impact of operating 
turnaround initiatives on auditors’ going-concern judgment is likely to be due to the 
indirect effect of management turnaround initiatives on going-concern judgment, reflected 
in an increased recall of negative financial going-concern evidence and a decreased recall 
of positive financial going-concern evidence.  In contrast, the positive effect of strategic 
information with a short-term impact is likely to be due to the positive direct effect of this 
type of information on going-concern judgment, which reflects auditors’ perceived 
adequacy of this type of turnaround initiatives.  The results from the fourth chapter 
however indicate that the auditor’s consideration of management turnaround initiatives 
may not always contribute to audit quality. In particular, our findings suggest that the 
consideration of strategic and operating initiatives are only beneficial to auditor reporting 




5.2  LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
The studies in this dissertation contribute to the auditing literature by exploring the 
role of strategic information in the going-concern decision process. This research, 
however, is subject to a number of limitations.   Moreover, given that audit research on the 
value of client strategic information is scant, numerous research avenues remain to be 
explored.  
A limitation that applies to all chapters relates to the size of the datasets used. In 
particular, the sample sizes in chapters 2 and 4 are kept rather small due to the manual 
collection of the strategic variables. In addition, only companies from manufacturing 
industries are included in these samples. Further research is needed to determine the 
generalizability of the findings to companies in other industries. It is reasonable to expect 
that auditors’ perceptions of the adequacy of management turnaround initiatives might 
vary across industries. In chapter 3, the small sample size mainly results from the fact that 
we required half of the participants to be auditing managers or partners, a group which 
typically has a very busy schedule. A replication of the reported experimental study with a 
larger sample would however be worth the effort as it would significantly improve the 
power of the statistical tests.  
 
Second, we used disclosure of strategic plans and information in the annual report 
and 10-K as our proxy of client strategic activity which implies that we do not take into 
account strategic plans that are disclosed directly to the auditor without being mentioned 
in the company’s 10-K. However, we do not believe that this will have a substantial 
impact on the conducted research as the suitability of 10-K filings for non-financial 
information collection is supported by prior research (see, for example Boo and Simnett, 
2002) and SEC registrants are required to disclose trends, demands, commitments, events 
and uncertainties presently known to management and likely to have material effects on 
the registrant’s financial condition (Securities Act Release no. 6835).  
Another limitation related to the data is the utilization of binary variables instead of 
more continuous measures of management turnaround initiatives in chapters 2 and 4. 
Future research could investigate whether alternate continuous variables that capture the 
monetary value of cost reduction or asset disposal initiatives provide additional 
explanatory power beyond the dichotomous variables. Potentially, the auditor’s perception  
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of the adequacy of management turnaround initiatives is dependent upon the 
pervasiveness of these initiatives.  
Furthermore, although recommended by SAS No. 59, we do not measure the 
feasibility or adequacy of the publicly disclosed strategic plans. It might be interesting 
though to link information with respect to a distressed companies’ operating and strategic 
health to the implemented turnaround initiatives in order to assess their appropriateness or 
feasibility. The strategic literature provides support for this type of turnaround analysis by 
emphasizing the importance of turnaround initiatives being in line with the specific 
problems of the distressed company. Research with respect to the auditor’s evaluation of 
turnaround initiatives may investigate the extent to which they perform a turnaround 
analysis and how it impacts their perception of the client’s turnaround strategy. A similar 
line of reasoning can be used to support the inclusion of the conditions in the client’s 
industry in the analysis. In particular, one can take into account the flexibility and growth 
opportunities in an industry to assess the chances of success of company strategic 
initiatives.  
 
We also discuss a number of limitations and suggestions each applying to only one 
specific chapter in this dissertation. A limitation that applies to the third chapter is the use 
of auditing students as inexperienced auditors. Although this is not uncommon in 
experimental auditing research (e.g. Frederick and Libby, 1986; Schultz and Hooks, 1998; 
McCracken, 2003; Hoffman, Joe and Moser, 2003), including audit seniors would add to 
the external validity of the study.  
A suggestion for future research following from chapter 3 relates to the 
investigation of the going-concern decision process. The study reported in this dissertation 
mainly focused on the processing of going-concern information. It might, however, be 
interesting to study the information acquisition process of going-concern information for 
experienced and inexperienced auditors. This type of research could be conducted by 
means of a going-concern information selection task, allowing the researcher to assess 
which types of strategic and other non-financial information items are of interest to the 
experienced and novice auditor in a going-concern decision context. 
With respect to investigation of audit reporting errors in the fourth chapter, future 
research might consider assessing the association between Type I misclassifications (i.e. 
the issuance of a going-concern report for a company that subsequently remains viable)  
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and management turnaround initiatives. Because the costs of Type I reporting errors are 
less apparent than the costs of Type II reporting errors, the focus of legislators, users and 
researchers has almost exclusively been on Type II reporting errors. However, Type I 
reporting errors are also deserving of our attention because of their potential negative 
impact on client satisfaction and future client viability (Francis, 2004). With this in mind, 
an interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate the impact of strategic 
information on the likelihood of Type I reporting errors. 
A limitation that also applies to the fourth chapter is the use of an audit firm 
dummy as a proxy for the audit methodology that was implemented by the auditor. Future 
research might refine this measure by assessing the degree to which the business risk 
approach is implemented by means of a survey. By granting each audit firm a rating based 
on a number of criteria that are indicative of the audit methodology used, a more 
informative proxy might be constructed. In addition, using this more refined measure, 
future research might study the effect of the business risk methodology on other indicators 
of audit quality, such as auditor litigation, earnings management etc. Another interesting 
topic for future research concerns the effect of audit methodology on other types of audit 
decisions, such as (1) client acceptance, (2) planning of audit testing and (3) audit fees. 
 
     
5.3 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS 
 
This last section provides some policy implications for audit practitioners, audit 
clients and regulators. We start by outlining the implications for audit practitioners, which 
follow mainly from the findings in the fourth chapter. More specifically, results on the 
analysis of determinants of audit reporting errors show that that Type II errors are more 
likely to occur if a client implements an operating turnaround approach, except when this 
client is audited by a specialist auditor. It hence might be useful to include auditors in the 
audit team possessing industry expertise when evaluating a severely distressed client 
pursuing operating turnaround initiatives.    
Second, with respect to the impact of audit methodology on reporting accuracy, the 
results of chapter four indicate that the likelihood of Type II errors is higher when a client 
resorting to an operating turnaround approach is audited by a business risk auditor. This 
suggests that an analysis of client strategic initiatives might not always be beneficial to  
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audit quality. Stated differently, it is not sufficient that the auditor considers operating and 
strategic initiatives to mitigate financial distress; he should also be adequately trained to 
judge the adequacy and feasibility of these initiatives. In particular the judgment of 
operating initiatives might require specialist knowledge.  
 
Implications for audit clients mainly follow from the results reported in chapters 2 
and 4. More specifically, the results from chapter 2 with respect to auditors’ evaluation of 
management turnaround initiatives might assist clients in assessing the consequences of 
their turnaround strategy on their auditor’s going-concern decision.  
In addition, audit clients might find the findings in chapter 4 with respect to the 
association between certain auditor characteristics and the likelihood of reporting errors 
particularly useful. These results suggest that a client with severe financial difficulties 
might reduce the likelihood of a Type II error by hiring an industry specialist auditor, 
especially when this client resorts to operating management actions to mitigate financial 
distress. 
 
Finally, we conclude by providing some policy implications for regulators. The 
results obtained in this dissertation provide an insight into the types of management 
initiatives that auditors consider in a going-concern decision context. The findings clearly 
indicate that auditors consider management initiatives beyond those suggested by SAS 
No. 59 and as such perform a rather thorough analysis of client initiatives to mitigate 
financial difficulties. 
However, our results also suggest that the consideration of certain management 
turnaround initiatives might give rise to an increased likelihood of audit reporting errors. 
In particular management initiatives that are part of an operating turnaround approach may 
increase the likelihood of Type II errors. Therefore, regulators should be careful to 
emphasize not only the auditor’s development of a thorough understanding of client 
objectives and strategies (ISA 315), but also the provision of adequate training to develop 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX 3.1: EXCERPTS FROM EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT: THE SECTION “CURRENT STRATEGIC 
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